Leviathan as Hobbes\u27s Narrative of Salvation by Howard, Michael Anthony
LEVIATHAN AS HOBBES'S NARRATIVE OF SALVATION 
A Thesis 
Presented to 
the Faculty of the College of Business and Public Affairs 
Morehead State University 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Public Administration 
by 
Michael Anthony Howard 
25 April 2011 
Accepted by the faculty of the College of Business and Public Affairs, 
Morehead State University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
Master of Public Administration degree. 
ms LI 
TH F5ES 
3J o. J I 
J/S'5 IL 
LEVI.ATHAN AS HOBBES'S NARRATIVE OF SALVATTON 
Michael Anthony Howard, M.P.A. 
Morehead State U niversity. 201 I 
Director of Thesis: _ ,----,,1),,_,_~~~C., ==9~?~~~~~::~::- ------
Salvation is the central theme of Leviathan. That is, it is a proposal for a rational form 
of government established for the purpose of immediate salvation on the basis of 
principles that could be trusted as certain, setting the foundation for a new science of 
politics that could no longer rely on prudence or prophecy. By comparing the 
Hobbesian narrative of salvation to the Hebrew narrative, what becomes clear is that 
Hobbes's real agenda is dealing with the problems of social chaos and the 
competition of obligations to political and religious authorities by presenting the state 
as the ultimate saJvific system. Hobbes used a narrative structure to tell a new story 
that was more trustworthy than other historica l accoun ts and the biblical narrative, 
which, according to Leviathan, was not only not trustworthy but deceptive and 
sed itious. 
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Introduction 
Salvation is sine qua non of Leviathan. Whether one assumes Hobbes's main 
driving force was the attempt firmly to root political and ethical theory in scientific 
methodology or to lay down a practical guide that will bring about real civic stability, 
the practical and theoretical ends are one and the same-salvation.1 That this has not 
been widely pointed out is perhaps due to the fact that the meaning of the term 
'salvation' has been watered down in Western cultures until it is most often 
conceived of in religious terms that actually contradict the word's meaning. As N. T. 
Wright has noted, "If 'salvation' means simply 'leaving behind the world of space, 
time and matter', then this is not really 'salvation' ."2 Salvation, as I mean it here, 
refers to an act of rescuing, preserving, defending, and securing-in other words, 
providing safety to those who need saving. It is my thesis that Hobbes's ultimate 
intention was to present humanity as needing to be saved, and therefore, needing 
Leviathan, which he engineered to be a system of political salvation. 
That Leviathan is to be seen as both theory and praxis is evident from its 
centermost passage, where Hobbes explains, "I recover some hope, that one time or 
other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider 
it himselfe ... and ... convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice" 
(xxxi, 193).* Salvation is always conceived as a narrative; it is always an event that 
• All citations from the English version of Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan used in this essay are chapter, 
followed by the page of the original 1651 text, which is readily available in all scholarly editions. I 
have relied on Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. or. The Matter, Forme, & Pawer of a Common-Wealth 
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brings about a change from a state of depravation to a state of release from that 
depravation.3 Leviathan lays out a theory aimed at presenting a narrative of how 
humanity can move from a state of chaos to a state of order, from fear to security, 
from war to peace. Is this narrative historical, philosophical, or religious? Is it a 
salvation narrative meant to tell how things became the way they are, a narrative to 
express how things should be, or simply a hope for some future salvation with no real 
regard for the chaos or conflict of the current life? The purpose of this thesis is to 
show that Leviathan's main agenda is to determine where salvation can be found, 
who has the authority to construct or retell this narrative, and thus, who ultimately sits 
in the real "Seat of Power."4 
By looking at Hobbes's view of the role of history in relation to his 
understanding of salvation, the major political elements discussed in Leviathan, 
particularly obligation and representation, can be more fully understood. Moreover, it 
becomes clear that Hobbes uses a scientific methodology to present a narrative 
framework that is presumed to be more trustworthy than history or revelation. That is, 
Hobbes does not just logically construct a system of politics based on a self-evident 
view of human nature. He aims to use scientific methodology to provide the 
conceptual framework for a salvation narrative meant to trump historical and 
religious based narratives in providing guidance for constructing a peaceful ordering 
of civil society. Hobbes's objective is to provide a new salvation that is accessible 
Ecclesiastical/ and Civil/, ed. Jan Shapiro (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), though there is 
no major difference between this version and that of Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991). 
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here and now and present it as the only salvation worth seeking. Polemically, the 
Leviathanian narrative presents a theory of sovereignty based on representation rather 
than divine right. Politically, this narrative provides the logical justification for one's 
obligation to obey the laws of the civil sovereign as a way of securing this 'here and 
now' salvation. Theologically, Hobbes's narrative clarifies what type of salvation one 
can expect to receive from God if one is also to expect the civil sovereign to provide 
political peace and security, especially when conflicts arise between religious and 
civil power. 
The salvation narrative produced by the logic of Leviathan is expected to 
serve as a reformation for historical and religious teachings about salvation, as shown 
in the following three tasks. After a brief review of the literature, I will first discuss 
Hobbes's understanding of salvation in comparison to the narrative and method of 
Leviathan. This will illuminate how Hobbes intends for his narrative to combat the 
problems of historical and religious knowledge. In other words, this first task will be 
concerned with showing how the salvation narrative of Leviathan, which is rooted in 
certainty, is aimed at overcoming the problems of prophecy and prudence. These 
problems arise in the learning and relaying of historical and religious facts and 
underline the importance of narrative in teaching precepts. In this way, I will show 
that the explanations about political and religious salvation in Leviathan are essential 
to the narrative of salvation underlying the logic of Hobbes's political theory. 
Once the relation between Leviathanian history and salvation are understood, 
the second task will be to show that the political elements of Leviathan-particularly 
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representation and obligation-depend on Hobbes's salvation narrative. Finally, the 
third task will be to show that to justify his argument, it was necessary for Hobbes to 
present a way of reading Hebrew Scripture----and thus a way of retelling Hebrew 
salvation history-that supports the political system and discourages sedition and 
revolt. 
Noticing the Salvific Role of Leviatl,an 
That salvation is a major theme in Leviathan has not gone unnoticed. When 
salvation is considered in relation to the role of the artificial state, however, it is often 
overlooked or mentioned only in passing. Salvation seems, for many who discuss 
Leviathan, only a religious theme that has very little to do with the overall aims of the 
rest of Hobbes's political theory. However, Michael Oakeshott5 does more than pass 
it by when he discusses the Latin introduction to Leviathan.• It is interesting how 
easily a simple word can be overlooked and how much difference it can make when it 
is noticed. Seventeen years after its original publication in English, Leviathan's Latin 
version reveals and important change in Hobbes's wording. As Oakeshott discusses, 
Hobbes introduces the leviathan in nearly the same way, with one slight but 
significant difference, as shown in the table below.6 
• Citations from the Latin version of Leviathan are cited as OP: chapter, followed by the page of the 
1668 text from Thomas Hobbes, Thoma, Hobbes Malmesburiensis Opera Philosophica Qua, Latine 
Scripsit Omnia. ed. Sir William Molesworth, vol. 3 (London: Bohn, 1839). 
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English (1651) Oakeshott's Translation Latin (1668) 
- -
For by Art is created that Magnus ille Leviathan, great LEVIATHAN called This great Leviathan, 
a COMMON-WEALTH, which is called the state, is quae civitas appellature, 
or STATE, (in latine a work of art; it is an opificium artis est et homo 
CIVITAS) which is but an artificial man made for the artificialis, quanquam 
Artificial! Man; though of protection and salvation homine naturali, propter 
greater stature and of the natural man, to cujus protectionem et 
strength than the Natural!, whom it is superior in salutem excogitatus est, et 
mole et robore multo for whose protection and grandeur and power. 
major. defence it was intended. 
While Oakeshott does not explicitly point out that the Latin version is 
different than the English, he seems to have noticed. While the English version 
explains that the role of the artificial leviathan (the state) is the "protection and 
defense" of humanity, the Latin version describes the role as "protectionem et 
salutem" (protection and salvation). One wonders why Hobbes did not simply use 
"protectionem et defensionem," since this would have been a more direct translation 
of his original English version, that is, unless one notices that Hobbes intended a 
different readership for his Latin version and that in the earlier 1660s some Anglican 
bishops threatened that Hobbes would be tried for heresy.7 
One may point out that salutem and 'defense' are closely related enough that 
it is unsound to assume that this difference is in any way significant. However, 
Hobbes himself specifically says, "Vitre autem reternre gaudia comprehenduntur a 
Scriptoribus Sacris sub nomine salutis sive salvationis"(OP: xxxviii, 330, boldface 
added). His English version reads, "The joyes of Life Eternal!, are in Scripture 
comprehended all under the name of SALVATION, or Being Saved" (xxxviii, 245). 
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It is not inconceivable to assume that, since Hobbes understood salvation in scripture 
to be referred to under the same names "salutis [or] salvation is," he should expect us 
to read his own salutis in the same way-that the role of leviathan and Hobbes's 
understanding of salvation were related. 
Oakeshott uses this phrase to point out that the importance of salvation is 
central to most of the masterpieces of political philosophy including Leviathan. He 
continues, "political philosophy .. .is the consideration of the relation between civil 
association and eternity." So in Leviathan, it is easy to see that, as Oakeshott explains, 
"the civitas is conceived as the deliverance of a man observed to stand in need of 
deliverance." Oakeshott goes on to say that "[w]hen we turn to make this enquiry of 
the great political philosophies, we find that, each in its own convention, they 
maintain the view that civil association is contributory to the fulfillment of an end 
which it cannot itself bring about."8 Oakeshott seems to suggest that salvation is one 
of those ideas that "distinguishes Hobbes from all earlier and most later writers,"9 yet 
it is surprising that this topic has not gathered more interest. 
Perhaps this is, as J. G. A. Pocock has pointed out, because the third and 
fourth books of Leviathan "have been seriously neglected by scholars because the 
subject matter is exegesis and eschatology, not philosophy, with the result that it was 
assumed that they could not matter and Hobbes could not have meant them 
seriously."10 Pocock makes great strides in pointing out the importance of Hobbes's 
view of "sacred history" and has caused many scholars, not the least of whom is 
Patricia Springborg, to focus more on Hobbes's religious ideas. Even so, Pocock only 
Page 13 
casually mentions the salvific role of Leviathan in saying that Hobbes's "history of 
prophetic authority has been projected into an eschatological future. His politics have 
taken on a messianic dimension, just as the messianism they entail is almost brutally 
political."11 
Patricia Springborg has unquestionably made much of discussing Hobbes's 
emphasis on the role of ecclesiastical history, church authority, and religious beliefs. 12 
Her influence and many of her insights about the competition of authority will be 
noticeable in the arguments that follow, yet she rarely calls attention to the way 
Hobbes's historical ideas and religious insights concerning salvation make his 
political theory all the more intelligible. 
Kinch Hoekstra does, however, take note of it. He explains that Hobbes was 
less concerned with persuading the apolitical individuals to come together and form a 
commonwealth than with calling together those who are already citizens to "a 
punctilious obedience," seeing that "salvation is already theirs; they need only 
embrace it." 13 However, Hoekstra notices this saving role of the state because his 
goal was to draw out a discussion about the natural state of humanity and compare 
Hobbes's view to others, especially the various prelapsarian Christian traditions. In 
doing so, he arrives at much the same conclusion about Hobbes's view of the role of 
the commonwealth as this thesis. Drawing on the work of Christopher Love, Hoekstra 
compares the Apostle Paul's address in Ephesians 2 (emphasizing verse 12) with 
Hobbes's description of the natural state of humanity. In both, Hoekstra points out, 
humanity lacks law and commonwealth (in Paul's writings, this means 'aliens to the 
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commonwealth oflsrael') and is in a condition of misery and damnation. In both of 
these statements Hoekstra appears to point out how Hobbes's theory revolves around 
an idea of salvation. Nevertheless, Hoekstra does not follow this thought through any 
further than this. 14 
Similarly, Roberto Farneti argues that salvation was an important concept in 
Leviathan. 15 He explains, as will be pointed out again later, that during Hobbes's 
time, a clear understanding about what 'salvation' meant and what was required for it 
was a key concept in the political literature resulting from the civil wars. Yet, 
Farneti's argument focuses entirely on Hobbes's conception of 'eternal salvation' 
without any reflection that the idea of salvation might play a larger role in Hobbes's 
political theory. He suggests that Hobbes uses Apostle Paul's vocabulary and 
framework to come up with his own political theology where salvation plays a pivotal 
role, but again Farneti simply means 'eternal salvation.' 
Like Pocock, Luc Borot presents an instructive argument about how history 
plays a pivotal role in Hobbes's thought.16 He clearly presents Hobbes's view of the 
function of history as a teacher. In his discussion, he refers to the thirty-eighth chapter 
of Leviathan to make the following claim. "The fundamental antirnillenarism of 
Hobbes's exegesis is here again, to smother the serpent of the chiliastic expectations 
that prompt men of misdirected faith and energy to rebel against the lawful authority 
of their kings-who yet are kings by God's laws-led to it by the preachers' use of 
incomprehensible words. "17 The argument here is that there is something more in 
Hobbes's discussion about sacred history and history as a teacher that invites us to 
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pay closer attention to the parallels between the Hebrew history of salvation and the 
'ahistorical' narrative of salvation Hobbes lays out in Leviathan. 
Just as Borot and Springborg nearly arrive at the same conclusion that Pocock 
had, though he did not explore it, that Hobbes's leviathan stands as the savior of 
mankind, Bryan Garsten18 comes similarly close following Quentin Skinner19 in his 
discussion of Hobbes's theory of representation. Garsten showed how Hobbes's 
strange theory of representation allowed for an understanding of the civil sovereign as 
both the representative of the multitude of the people and the representative of God. 
As Garsten explains it, this allowed for an understanding of the sovereign in a way 
that ''turned" the language of the Parliamentarians and simultaneously avoided the 
political instability that was the central problem with the notion of rule by divine 
right. In the revealing way he explains the relationship between these two functions of 
Hobbes's rhetoric, what Garsten comes close to mentioning, but does not point out, is 
the underlying importance of the role salvation pays in the Leviathenian theory of 
representation. 
Leon H. Craig, in his recent revealing work on Hobbes, The Platonian 
Leviathan, hints at, and comes very close to stating explicitly, the messianic role 
Hobbes places on the state. On the very same page of text, Craig explores several 
important related themes. He presents Hobbes's contrast between civil and divine 
authority as deriving from the power to control life and death. He explains that the 
"role of the supernatural within religion, and the irrational beliefs in general, must be 
reduced to manageable proportions if a rational political science is to prevail." He 
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also makes an interesting comment on a quote from Hobbes: "Reason is the pace, 
Encrease of Science, the way, and Benefit of man-kind, the end' (v, 22). Realizing 
Hobbes is simultaneously talking about metaphors and senseless speech and Hobbes 
has warned his reader against using "the way" as a phrase when reckoning about 
something (v, 20), Craig comments, "Jesus is not 'the way.' Science is."2° Craig's 
additional note explains that Hobbes intends to show indirectly that "the only faith 
humans need is faith in Reason."21 
While Craig has noticed the important authority Hobbes places on reason, 
even claiming that Hobbes intends to replace Jesus with science and faith with reason, 
he does not explore the connection between their perspective roles at length. If one 
were to consider even slightly the implication that 'Jesus' is a transliterated form ofa 
Hebrew name that means 'salvation,' one would not miss that Craig's reading of 
Hobbes clearly points to something of great significance about the role of leviathan, 
both as the name for the 'mortal god' character in Hobbes's narrative and the 
narrative itself. However, there is something deeper here, which Craig is touching on 
but not making explicit. Hobbes's emphasis on reason to provide the grounds for 
salvation is not just an idea that is contrary to the biblical account (though Hobbes 
would deny this); the emphasis on reason is not just aimed at curbing the political 
problems that prophecy and divine revelation present. Hobbes actually aims at 
replacing the expectation for divinely ordered salvation with a salvation that is 
directed purely by reason. Moreover, what this thesis will show is that this intention 
of Hobbes encompasses the entire narrative and theory of Leviathan. 
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Leo Strauss makes the clear argument that Hobbes's insight into human nature 
was the driving force of his theory and method.22 As Strauss argues, at the fertile 
moment when Hobbes developed his political theory, "the classical and theological 
tradition was already shaken, and a tradition of modem science [had] not yet [been] 
formed and established."23 It was in this fertile moment, which Farneti also explored, 
that Hobbes asks the questions of the right life and the right order of society. 
However, Strauss says that Hobbes chose to use the scientific method because he 
could only choose between the philosophical tradition and modem science.24 There 
was another method, reliance on religious doctrine. Strauss points out that the 
philosophical tradition presupposed a traditional view of humanity, while modem 
science did not lend itself well to beginning with a moral attitude. What Strauss does 
not mention, at least in this stage of his argument, is that scripture also presented a 
view of human nature. Strauss argues that this is the basis of Hobbes's contradictions 
and is necessary to get an adequate interpretation of Hobbes's philosophy and 
recognize its principles. 25 One of the important insights Strauss makes, then, is to 
point out that when Hobbes argued that priestly rule was inconsistent with reason, and 
then presented the places where scripture vouched for priestly rule, Hobbes was no 
longer presenting "an argument for priestly rule, but an argument against Scripture."26 
There are several other important insights Strauss has made about Hobbes's 
theory which are relevant to the current discussion. As Luc Borot would later do, 
Strauss presented a thorough argument of the role that history played in presenting a 
narrative from which moral precepts could be gained. Similarly, he asked the ever 
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important question in political philosophy about what Hobbes thought was the 
ultimate good. Strauss suggests that Hobbes did not have an ultimate good, but'only a 
supreme evil, which was death: "For death is not only the negation of the primary 
good, but is therewith the negation of all goods, including the greatest good: and at 
the same time, death-being the summum ma/um, while there is no summum 
bonum-is the only absolute standard by reference to which man may coherently 
order his life."27 In putting it this way, Strauss has pointed out (although not by using 
the same exact phrasing) that salvation from death is at least one good for which 
Hobbes's political philosophy aims. 
In Strauss's essay on Hobbes in Spinoza's Critique of Religion, he argues that 
religion and science, in the sense of technology, are aimed toward the same end, 
which is seeking after causes in order to serve the happiness of mankind-which is 
safety and security from the fear of death by violence. In this sense, religion is not in 
opposition to reason, with respect to ends; religion is only "an attempt made with 
ineffective means."28 In terms of morality, Strauss argues that Hobbes views the 
relationship between religion and science as opposites; because religion is rooted in 
the prime political evil of gloratio (boasting). This is because political life is 
"animated by the spirit of peace and civil society, [where] we see reason and religion 
opposed one to the other, from beginning to end."29 
In this vein, Strauss makes the major claim that the current argument aims to 
follow. While often quoted and misquoted, it is worth repeating here as it lays a solid 
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background for the arguments that will flow from my major thesis about Hobbes's 
theory of salvation. 
Hobbes distinguishes between the 'natural seed ofreligion' (anxiety and dreams), 
and the 'culture' which religion took on within paganism and then revelation. The 
culture ofreligion takes as its aim the education of mankind to obedience, peace, love 
and ordered society. For the pagans, religion was a part of politics. The pagan 
legislators and founders of states brought it about, by the establishment of suitable 
institutions, that the populace should never even contemplate rebellion, but remain 
content with bread and circuses. The powerful Romans tolerated every type of 
religion within their city with the exception of Judaism, in which obedience to a 
mortal king was forbidden. The view which is here thus referred back to the Jews is 
contested by Hobbes as rebellious and likely to lead to rebellion. Obedience to the 
established power is never sin. Rather, rebellion against established authority is sin. 
Revelation, the second path opened to the culture of natural religion with its basis in 
fear and dream, makes politics a part of religion. It thus, ifwe understand Hobbes 
aright, reverses the natural relationship which was realized in paganism.30 
Carl Schmitt follows an argument somewhat similar, suggesting as well that 
Hobbes not only "destroyed the tradition and legitimate foundations for asserting 
divine right" but wanted to unite religion and politics together under a "monarchical 
belief."31 Schmitt's argument, however, was that Leviathan was both a success and a 
failure. It was a success in that it was able to conceptualize the state as a political 
mechanism that operated on the "value-and-truth neutrality of a technical 
instrument."32 However, Leviathan was a failure because it allowed for the right of 
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private freedom of thought and belief in the political system that would later be 
exploited by Spinoza and others, to turn the state into an "external cult." As Schmitt 
argues, "This contained the seed of death that destroyed the mighty leviathan from 
within and brought about the end of the mortal god.',33 
What Schmitt has pointed out is the serious and important contrast between 
religion and political devotion that Hobbes's political theory wrestles with from 
beginning to end. Schmitt makes the most of this complex dichotomy by pointing out 
Hobbes's critique of miracles while simultaneously expanding on the important 
beginning phrase of Leviathan where humanity mimics the work of God through 
creating the "artificial man." Schmitt asks, "Who is this god who brings peace and 
security to people tormented by anguish, who transforms wolves into citizens and 
through this miracle proves himself to be a god, obviously a 'mortal god,' a deus 
mortalis, as Hobbes called him?',34 If one gives much thought to Schmitt's question 
and his argument, it becomes evident that, while he may have seen the Leviathan in 
some ways to be a failure, his prose certainly goes a long way toward paying Hobbes 
homage. 
A fuller account that directly hits Hobbes's use of theological language to 
combat the seditious political nature of miracles and revelation is Joel Schwartz's 
discussion in his article "Hobbes and the Two Kingdoms of God."35 Schwartz 
summarizes Hobbes's position from the forty-fourth chapter of Leviathan, that "the 
greatest and main abuse of Scripture" (xliv, 334) is using it to prove that the "Jewish 
kingdom of God" can exist in the present. He does not shy away from pushing 
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Strauss's argument a bit further by saying that the particular conception of the 
kingdom of God that assumes divine intervention in the current world (that is, the 
perspective of God in the Hebraic tradition) threatens the authority of the sovereign. 
In summary, what Strauss, Schmitt, and Schwartz have suggested here i's that 
Hobbes aimed to unite ( or re-unite) religion and politics so that religion is again a part 
of politics (rather than the reverse). This is an important point that I will further 
elaborate. What is interesting, however, is how Hobbes does this and what it means in 
terms of Hobbes's view of God and religion. As is seen in Strauss's point about 
religion-"The culture of religion takes as its aim the education of mankind to 
obedience, peace, love and ordered society"-religion aims at education, not worship 
of a divine savior. That is, obedience, peace, love, and order are ends for which the 
human efforts that are somehow encompassed in religion are merely means. As this 
thesis will point out, the analysis of Strauss, Schmitt, and Schwarts is helpful, but it 
does not point out that Hobbes was able to arrive at the formula of "obedience to the 
established power is never sin," though it is an exact reversal of the biblical mandate 
which he used as evidence to support his claim. What this thesis will point out is how 
Hobbes was able to present this reversal through his Leviathanian political theory of 
salvation and his reworking the central teachings of Judaism and Christianity as 
presented in the Ten Commandments. 
Despite the clear-cut and candid readings of Strauss, Schmitt, and Schwartz 
and their pointing out what I take to be the most important questions in Leviathan, an 
even more revealing and straightforward perspective on Hobbes's political theory was 
Page22 
made in the argument of William Cavanaugh in his Theopolitical Imagination.36 As a 
theologian who has focused much of his effort on presenting the theological-political 
problem as one of the central problems (if not the central problem) of faith, 
Cavanaugh boldly addresses what he sees to be the major aims of the political 
philosophy of Hobbes. In the opening pages of the first chapter, called "The Myth of 
the State as Savior," Cavanaugh begins offering his own reading of Hobbes, Locke, 
and Rousseau in order to show that their aim was to "save humanity from the 
pernicious effects of disunity through the mechanism of the state. "37 While I have 
come to agree with his conclusion, students of political theory cannot simply take a 
theologian at his word without asking for more than a mere theological aphorism. We 
must ask for a more thorough reading and for the provision of evidence and argument 
directly concerning Hobbes's theory, or the theories of any of the political 
philosophers he criticizes, before determining if Cavanaugh's position is justified. 
This is what the current thesis aims to accomplish. 
There are certainly many more Hobbes scholars and, indeed, much more 
scholarship on the topic than is possible to recount for the current purposes. What this 
short review of some of the literature has presented, however, is that Hobbes's 
intention for Leviathan to be a treatise about the salvific role of the state is not one 
that has gone unnoticed by scholars, and yet has not been fully examined and 
developed. What the following discussion aims to accomplish, then, is to build on the 
scholarship that has just been mentioned and achieve two important goals. First, this 
discussion will follow more thoroughly Cavanaugh's directive and show clearly that 
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salvation was more than just a major religious doctrine for Hobbes, and that he 
intended to do more than just minimalize Christian salvation for the sake of his 
political agenda, but that creating a system of comprehensive salvation apart from 
divine intervention was the theme that provided the conceptual framework for his 
entire .theory and narrative. Second, I will show that many important interpretive 
insights, not far removed from those just mentioned, can be seen to derive directly 
from Hobbes's use of salvation ideas. 
The Narrative of Salvation 
It is not hard to see that Hobbes's Leviathan lays out a narrative of salvation. 
The process of progressing from a state of fear to a state of peace and security can 
only be made intelligible in the context of a narrative. In other words, the explanatory 
power of salvation lies in its narrative formation. Hobbes's genius is to present the 
state not as a natural or divine institution but as a saving institution developed by 
human beings in order to rescue themselves from the natural state of chaos and war. 
It has already been suggested that confusion can arise as to what the term 
'salvation' actually means. Answering this question is at the heart of Hobbes's 
agenda. To begin with, much confusion comes from the fact that salvation could be 
understood as theological, political, or both theological and political. In any case, it 
must not be overlooked that salvation is always in reference to a kind of saving. It 
involves being saved or rescued from something or for some special purpose. 
Salvation is most often used in reference to a stronger being who has brought 
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deliverance from some kind of danger or disaster. Thus, it will be important for the 
current argwnent to recognize who is the savior, who is being saved, and from what 
they need saving. 
Salvation can be thought of as an "other worldly" theological concept, such as 
is often suggested in the Christian beliefs about salvation from the powers of sin and 
death. Salvation can also be an expression of an important "this worldly" political 
concept, in the form of rescuing the citizenry from military defeat, providing safety in 
dangerous situations, or being forgiven for some criminal act that deserved 
punishment In both cases, salvation is understood as a saving action that brings a 
state of safety (peace, security, forgiveness, etc.) provided by a savior to someone or 
some group in need of being saved. Of course, conflict may arise when there is a 
misunderstanding about who was, is, or will be the actor that saves those who need to 
be saved. 
This discussion will show that while Hobbes does not think all theological 
ideas about salvation are problematic-as can be seen in his repeated suggestion that 
''to Repent, and to Beleeve that Jesus is the Christ, is all that is required to Salvation" 
(xliii, 329}-he wants to make it clear that religious salvation must not conflict with 
the established political institution's salvific role, that is, so long as the political 
institution can be trusted to fulfill this role, having been developed with care and the 
certainty of method and reason. Salvation in civil and political life requires the 
establishment of laws, which are obligatory to ensure the state of salvation continues, 
rather than just mere principles that serve as moral suggestions. Similarly, a system of 
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authority derives from the ability of the political system to provide and maintain the 
salvation of its subjects. In Leviathan, this salvific system is the sole means of 
bringing order from chaos, security from fear, peace from war, and life rather than 
death. 
To deal with theological ideas of salvation, Hobbes confronts Hebrew and 
Christian soteriology directly. In its Hebrew context, salvation is most often 
understood in relation to God's covenant with the people oflsrael and the evidence of 
God's keeping of his promises as shown through his rescuing of the people oflsrael 
from foreign powers. In this sense, salvation simply refers to being liberated, being 
delivered, or being victorious. 38 The Hebrew salvation narrative is made especially 
clear through the observance of the several holy days that annually retell the narrative 
of God's saving power. As will be shown later, Hobbes uses the concept of salvation 
in relationship to the process of forming political covenant outlined in Leviathan as a 
way of discussing Israel's relationship to Moses and the Israelites' obligation to 
obedience of the Mosaic laws. That is, the ordering of Hobbes's narrative theory of 
salvation in Leviathan begins with the formation of a covenant that then establishes 
political authority because of its assurance to bring salvation which in turn forms the 
basis for obedience. Similarly, Hobbes explains the exodus story in a way that also 
reframes the relationship between political and theological salvation. 
In Christianity, it is generally agreed that salvation is centered on the events of 
the crucifixion and the resurrection of Jesus. It is important, however, to ask the 
following: What is Christian salvation meant to be a salvation from? Is it a salvation 
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from sin and thereby from punishment in hell? Or, in a more positive light, is it 
instead of salvation "from" a salvation "for" the Kingdom of God and thereby for the 
reward of heaven? These beliefs may manifest themselves as problems in gaining and 
maintaining political allegiance from those who need to be politically directed. It is 
important to note, though, that if one answers these questions in a particular way, they 
can seem quite removed from the previous Hebrew ideas about salvation. In fact, if 
one does not believe in the idea oflife after death, these ways oflooking at salvation 
may seem to have very little relevance in terms of one's political reality and everyday 
life. 
While salvation is at the core of the Christian tradition, there have been a wide 
variety of intellectual approaches to understanding salvation throughout Christian 
history. Because narrative is constitutive of soteriology39 and narrative assumes a 
particular ordering of events, it is important to clarify some of the common questions 
that arise about the chronology of salvation in the Christian traditions. In other words, 
it is often asked if salvation is something that has happened, is currently happening, 
or will happen in the future. 
As Alister McGrath points out, it is tempting to use a simplistic approach to 
this chronological question. In relation to the Apostle Paul's discussions about 
justification and sanctification, one may attempt to force justification, sanctification, 
and salvation into a chronological ordo salutis of past-present-future. Salvation, 
then, is seen only as a future event, which is "already anticipated and partially 
experienced in the past event of justification and the present event of sanctification, 
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and dependent on them."40 However, the orthodox Christian perspective of salvation 
must be understood as something that is past, present, and future. In simple terms, as 
McGrath explains, "the Christian understanding of salvation presupposes that 
something has happened, that something is now happening, and that something 
further will still happen.',41 
Salvation has meant various things throughout Christian history. For 
Athanasius of Alexandria in the fourth century, salvation was about "being made 
divine," which meant that humanity was able to participate in the being of God. 42 
Over the course of Christian history, it has also been referred to as one being seen as 
righteous in the sight of God, the attainment of personal holiness, the discovery of an 
authentic human existence, the gift of spiritual freedom, or some combination of 
several of these. Even as the Nicene Creed codified the belief that "[f]or us and for 
our salvation [Jesus] came down from heaven," and qualified the term salvation with 
the phrase "[w]e look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to 
come." This refers to past and future; no elaboration about what salvation means for 
the current life has become the authoritative standard. Therefore, while certain 
concepts and beliefs have been clarified through doctrine, no clear meaning of 
'salvation' that has significant implications for the needs of the current situation of 
life was ever determined and established as a standard part of Christian belief. 
Instead, different interpretations about what salvation means have found prominence 
in different periods of church history. 43 The fact that there has been so much 
Page28 
disagreement among Christians about the meaning of the central doctrine of salvation 
has important implications for a political theorist like Hobbes. 
The New Testament's most thorough discussion of salvation is found in the 
letters of the Apostle Paul. The language of Paul's letters proved difficult, as Roberto 
Farneti quotes Robert Boyle as having commented: "[ a]lthough the language is, 
Greek, the idiom is Semitic."44 In Hobbes's day, the difficulty in arriving at a final 
determination on the Christian understanding about salvation, however, was due to 
several important factors. Prior to the Reformation, the Papal See held the final say on 
the interpretation of theological ideas and what was necessary for salvation. With the 
Reformation and its emphasis on sola scriptura, a sense of urgency arose in the need 
to forge a final determination about ideas like salvation. After the Reformation, it 
became necessary for commentators of the Christian New Testament to wrestle anew 
with the concepts of salvation in the light of their new political and theological 
situation. They needed carefully to work out the underlying Semitic meaning of 
Paul's writings. Each political and religious faction had their own stake in what 
definitions would come to be accepted and what salvation would come to mean. 
Needless to say, in the 1640s, Hobbes took advantage of the intellectual debate in 
which a new doctrinal context was being worked out to make scripture apprehensible 
in the context of new political and religious situations.45 
This only serves to show how important the current discussion is and how 
important it is that we make sense of how Hobbes presented his own ideas about 
salvation. He explains that scripture uses the word "salvation" to mean the ''joys of 
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life." To qualify this phrase, he further explains, "To be saved, is to be secured, either 
respectively, against speciall Evills, or absolutely against all Evill, comprehending 
Want, Sicknesse, and Death it self' (xxxviii, 245). God, having made humanity 
immortal and not subject to corruption, fell from this state of happiness because of the 
sin of Adam. Hobbes explicitly states that "to be saved from Sin, is to be saved from 
all the Evill, and Calamities that Sinne hath brought upon us" (xxxviii, 245), and that 
the "discharge of sin" is also the emancipation from the horrors of death and misery. 
Similarly, because Jesus brings "salvation absolute" for the faithful, he is called 
Savior. Here, Hobbes presents the meaning and parameters of salvation, leaving no 
room for discussion about who is the savior, who is being saved, and from what they 
need saving. 
In this same passage where he presents his interpretation of salvation, Hobbes 
goes into a detailed interpretation of five particular verses from Isaiah 33 to make a 
distinction between 'particular salvation' and 'general salvation' (xxxviii, 245-47). 
Hobbes explains that 'particular salvation' is the salvation that was available for 
Israel at one time. Having God as its sovereign, Israel's salvation was both political 
and theological. Hobbes interestingly says that this kind of salvation needs no further 
discussion since there is "neither difficulty, nor interest'' enough ''to corrupt the 
interpretation of texts of that kind." 'General salvation' is, however, more difficult. It 
is a 'salvation absolute' that will include the Gentiles; will be located on earth in 
Jerusalem; will have God as king; and will be where there is no sickness. This is only 
to be realized "at the coming again of Christ," "after the day of judgment," and in the 
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"WORLD TO COME" (xxxviii, 246-8). Thus, we find that for Hobbes Christian 
salvation, to which general salvation refers, still considers God as the savior and the 
Christians as the saved, but the act of saving is an eschatological event only to be 
realized in a future world far removed from the present realities oflife. 
However, the political ramifications of each kind of salvation must be 
considered. While a more active form of salvation with real political implications was 
available in the form of 'particular salvation' for the people of Israel, it is not 
presently available in the current world. Similarly, general salvation is available for 
faithful Christians, but it has been relegated to a future realm and has no direct 
political implications for the present situation. What then of those who have no 
particular salvation here and now? Do they have a need to be saved? Who or what 
can do it? In fact, for one who does not believe in life after death, a political order that 
reflects this theological perspective of salvation may be welcomed since political 
decisions will be expected to rest on something other than divine intervention. 
However, with the belief in future, general, and absolute salvation come real 
and important indirect political implications that must be considered. At the time of 
Thomas Hobbes the people of England had not yet forgotten the execution of Sir 
Thomas More over a century earlier. More had been publicly executed for treason 
because he refused to recognize King Henry VIII as the Supreme Head of the Church 
of England. He could have simply spoken aloud what he did not believe in his heart, 
yet he did not. Instead, he preferred to die rather than declare that the political 
sovereign of England held the highest office in religious matters and therefore could 
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make his own church. It is not hard to believe that instances like this were on 
Hobbes's mind when he speaks about the theological-political problems that arise out 
of the confusion about salvation. These problems also demonstrate the tension 
between one's present salvation and one's future salvation. 
The maintenance ofCivill Society, depending on Justice; and Justice on the power of 
Life and Death, and other lesse Rewards and Punishments, residing in them that have 
the Soveraignty of the Common-wealth; It is impossible a Common-wealth should 
stand, where any other than the Soveraign, hath a power of giving greater rewards 
than Life; and of inflicting greater punishments than Death. Now seeing Eternal/ life 
is a greater reward, than the life present; and Eternal/ torment a greater punishment 
than the death of Nature; It is a thing worthy to be well considered, of all men that 
desire (by obeying Authority) to avoid the calamities of Confusion, and Civill war, 
what is meant in holy Scripture, by Life Eternal/, and Torment Eternal/; and for what 
offences, against whom committed, men are to be Eternally tormented; and for what 
actions, they are to obtain Eternal/ life. (xxxviii, 238) 
Here, Hobbes is explicit about the competition between political and religious 
authority. He declares that when anyone other than the sovereign of the 
commonwealth has the power to give any "greater rewards than life" or to inflict any 
"greater punishment than death" then it is impossible for a commonwealth to stand. 
The reasoning is clear. Obedience is related to punishment and salvation. When there 
is a competition of authority, the victor is simply the one who threatens the gre~test 
punishment and offers the greatest salvation. As is the case with Sir Thomas More, 
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individuals are often willing to risk a salvation that has been politically provided for 
the sake of securing eternal salvation. In other words, obligation and authority are 
derivatives of the sovereign's ability to provide salvation. Recognizing that salvation 
is a central theme in Leviathan------or, as I would suggest, the central theme-Hobbes's 
description of what salvation means should be compared with the whole of his own 
narrative and theory about the situation in which people find themselves and what can 
be done about it. 
The Narrative and Theory of Leviatl,an 
In terms of the narrative structure of Leviathan, individuals begin in a state of 
nature filled with chaos and war. It is the ultimate nightmare. The odious thirteenth 
chapter of Leviathan is filled with descriptions of this state where every individual is 
at war with every other. The description of this state-like the monstrous name 
Hobbes gives to the entire work, not to mention its reputation-arouses fear and 
anxiety and makes the reader evermore ready to hear Hobbes's solution. Yet, out of 
this place of desert, death, and destruction, Hobbes shows us how reason leads 
individuals to covenant with each other and to establish a political system of peace, 
safe from the natural state of violence. Salvation comes through the establishing of 
the leviathan, and individuals no longer need to be in fear of death-for they have 
gone from dark to light, crossed the impassible sea, and arrived at a land of peace, 
security, and prosperity. The civil system itself, guided by the principles of reason, 
stands as the actor that has brought salvation for those who need to be saved. Only 
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one thing remains for this civil instituted salvation to be Hobbes's salvati~n absolute: 
it is temporal and not eternal. 
However, Hobbes's salvation narrative is not historical. It is logical. The 
theoretical aim of Leviathan is to develop a system of"Theoremes ofMorall 
doctrine" that teaches "both how to govern, and how to obey," and has been 
"sufficiently or probably proved," so that, when it is turned into practice, it will bring 
real salvation with perpetual peace (xxxi, 193). It is not aimed at protecting historical 
institutions. In other words, the political engineer that seeks lasting peace must base 
the system on a method of proven certainty rather than historical accounts that are not 
always trustworthy. 
To lay the foundation for this, Hobbes explains that there are two kinds of 
knowledge: the knowledge of facts and the knowledge of consequences. History is 
the knowledge of facts and is considered by Hobbes to be absolute knowledge. This is 
because history is formed through experiences that have already occurred, leaving a 
past that provides an open fixed collection of facts that are readily accessible for 
observation. Science, on the other hand, which is the knowledge of consequences, is 
conditional because one cannot know with certainty what future events will occur (ix, 
40; cf. v). One can only predict. The more accurate the prediction, the more prudent 
will be one's choices (iii, 10-11). 
In other words, history provides facts for assessment, which allow for the 
evaluation of past choices based on the resulting consequences and suggests what 
future choices will bring about similar consequences. The more experience one has 
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the more accuracy one will expect from his or her predictions and the less failure will 
occur. Those with the most experience are able to make predictions about the future 
with the greatest accuracy and therefore have the best chance of guessing whatgood 
and evil may come. One with the most experience has the best chances of predicting 
rightly and therefore is able to provide the best counsel (vii, 29). When an event 
happens according to prediction, this is called prudence (v, 21 ). However, this is only 
conditional knowledge; science based on history is merely prediction; all expectations 
are mere presumptions. Real foresight is providence which only belongs to God (iii, 
10). 
Here again is that competition of authority which is also at the heart of the 
theoretical problem. If one is to engineer a proven perpetual means of security, free 
from the dangerous state of all against all, it must rest on more than mere prediction. 
Direct access to God through a prophet, then, presents an important theoretical and 
practical consideration. That is, prophetic declarations are assumed to provide more 
certainty than prudence because "foresight of things to come, which is Providence, 
belongs onely to him by whose will they are to come [in other words, God]. From 
him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds Prophecy" (iii, 10). 
If this is accepted, then, when experience causes a prudent individual to view 
the prophet's declarations with skepticism, the prophetic prescriptions about the order 
of political life will always win out. There are two important reasons for this. First, if 
God is omniscient, then true prophetic knowledge provided directly from God is 
direct information about real future events. Second, if God is omnipotent and is able 
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to supply the greatest rewards and punishments, then disobedience to God's 
directions declared through the prophet is the most dangerous of all choices. The 
skeptic then has two tasks: 1) he or she must show the prophet to be a phony, and 2) 
he or she must rely on a wisdom that is even more certain than prudence. If salvation 
is the central theme of Leviathan, the theoretical aim may be summarized in that it 
seeks to present a political theory of salvation that accomplishes both tasks while at 
the same time dealing with the obligation issue. 
Prophecy, Prudence, and the Primacy of Reason 
It must be shown how Hobbes deals with prophecy first because, as long as 
divinely inspired foreknowledge and direction exists, any other kind of guidance for 
political clirection will always be second-class and less than divine. Therefore, before 
explaining how to arrive at a certainty to which a political theory that will bring about 
lasting salvation will be rooted, we must first see how Hobbes handles the problem of 
prophetic political direction. Hobbes explains that prophecy is not an art or a 
vocation. Prophets are God's spokespersons who pronounce the words of God. What 
is important is the recognition that there are also imposters. God speaks to prophets 
immediately in a way that makes them understand the divine will. Prophecy supposes 
a vision, a dream, or some other special and admired gift of direct mediation of the 
will of God. What is important for Hobbes's theory is that the one who prophesies 
proposes to be speaking for God and therefore "pretends to govern." For this reason, 
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Hobbes explains, God has gifted humanity with the ability to use reason to distinguish 
between the true and false prophets (xxxvi, 225-32). 
Anyone claiming the gift of prophecy, therefore, has two criteria that must be 
satisfied: they must perform miracles and they must not contradict the established 
authority (xxxii, 197). This is because, in the context of the current discussion, 
prophets are those who seek to provide political direction, and miracles are meant to 
serve as indicators of true prophecy. Prophets are representatives of God's 
sovereignty, and miracles are signs that support one's divinely established authority 
as God's representative. Without the use ofreason to discern the truth of their 
teachings and miracles to confirm their calling, people "must suffer themselves to bee 
lead by some strange Prince; or by some of their fellow subjects, that can bewitch 
them ... and by this means ... reduce all Order, Government, and Society, to the first 
Chaos of Violence, and Civill warre" (xxxvii, 232). 
Hobbes argues that, in the present age, the role of the prophet is emptied of all 
power, because "Miracles now cease" (xxxii, 198). This period, which is the time 
between the ascension and the resurrection, is a time of regeneration. It is not a time 
of God's "Reigning" (xiii, 269). Having relegated the general salvation to a future 
period, Hobbes claims the "kingdom of Christ is not to begin till the general 
resurrection." During this current period of regeneration, the kingdom of God is not 
properly called a kingdom, and therefore does not justify disobedience to the 
magistrate (xii, 262-4). It is important to note the special saving role that a kingdom 
maintains for Hobbes's theory. The "kingdom" of God cannot presently be called a 
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kingdom because a kingdom is an "estate ordained by men for their perpetuall 
security against enemies, and want" (xxxviii, 246). That is, miracles now cease, 
prophets are powerless, salvation is not available until a later time, and God's 
sovereignty is not in competition for authority. Thus, given the character of the state 
of nature, humanity is in need of being saved presently, and that salvation must come 
from another source. 
As we see, in the discussion about salvation in Leviathan, Hobbes has 
separated history into three parts in order to answer the theological question about 
Christian salvation. This is exactly the theological shortcut around the orthodox 
understanding about Christian salvation against which McGrath warned, as I earlier 
suggested. As Hobbes explains, "There are three worlds mentioned in Scripture, the 
Old World, the Present World, and the WORLD TO COME" (xxxviii, 247). The divinely 
directed salvation, for Hobbes, is a general, absolute, and eternal salvation, but it has 
no real direct implication for the inunediate political order. 
In the time of regeneration, therefore, where miracles cease, all prophecy is 
false. By eliminating prophecy, Hobbes had accomplished a major part of the 
theoretical aim of Leviathan, which was to develop a salvific political system based 
on certainty. This means that, at least during this time, prudence remains as an 
alternative to prophecy and a guide to finding safety and securing peace. This would, 
however, only serve to provide further support to historically rooted institutions that 
could claim they were based on historically proven principles. Therefore, another of 
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the theoretical tasks of Leviathan is to show what problems still remain with prudence 
after which he suggested that there can be an even better form of wisdom. 
Hobbes's introduction to Thucydides clearly shows how he sees the value of 
the historical narrative as a teacher of precepts and laying the groundwork for 
prudence. He explains that by studying history, one may "draw out lessons to himself, 
and of himself be able to trace the drifts and counsels of the actors to their seat"46 
That is, a reader of historical narratives can see which goals lead to actions and 
guidance that bring about success, and which ones bring about failures. It is best 
when one learns and obeys precepts for their own sake. Hobbes understands, 
however, that one does not usually follow precepts for their own sake but for the 
consequences that result. In other words, the study of historical facts presented in 
narrative form provides one with the ability to learn about consequences. The 
narrative of history is the presentation of facts in such a way that makes science and 
the learning of prudence possible. 
Why, then, would the learning of prudence be problematic? Because obtaining 
certainty through an accurate account of past events proves impossible. Individuals 
can only know historical facts in two ways, through personal experience or 
vicariously. In either case, it is only possible to know things about the past using 
memory, which Hobbes understands to be the decay that occurs in one's imagination 
of events (ii, 5-6). Either one's own recollection of experience must be trusted, or one 
must trust the memory and retelling of others' experiences. Both are fallible. 
Experience is nothing more than collections of many memories of many events. 
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There is, however, a third option. Just as the knowledge of consequences can lead us 
to make presumptions about future events, presumptions can be made about the past. 
When a person sees the aims that have led one state to fall into a war, one may see the 
ruins of another state and make the educated guess that both have fallen from similar 
causes (iii, 11 ). So while knowledge of fact is absolute knowledge, obtaining absolute 
knowledge about the past with certainty is problematic; the best one can do is depend 
on memory, presumption, or testimony. 
If one comes to believe the testimonies of history from others, it is an 
expression of faith and authority in those people. In this case, certainty rests in the 
fidelity of another's witness. As Hobbes puts it, if the histories of Alexander or 
Caesar are considered unbelievable, it is only the historian who has cause to be 
offended. In this way, faith and history are intimately connected. What is believed for 
no other reason than someone has told it, Hobbes explains, is rooted in one's faith in 
the historian. Stated another way, what one believes about the "facts" of history may 
not be true, but they may be deemed acceptable because those in authority have 
determined them to be so (vii, 31-32; cf. v, 22). 
Similarly, the narrative of history can be dangerous if one considers the 
problems that come with memory, which is decaying imagination. In other words, 
memory is not trustworthy, whether it is one's own memory or the memory of others. 
The danger comes in what Hobbes calls compound imaginations, which are fictions 
of the mind. He explains that, just as one imagines a centaur because one had the 
memory of a man and a horse, one can compound memories of oneself with others 
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and assume oneself to be like Hercules or Alexander (ii, 5-6). In this way, humans 
can fancy things they never saw, creating false idols and false histories (xiv, 358-9). 
Thus, while history is beneficial because it serves as an instructor for 
prudence, historical knowledge, while absolute, remains uncertain. Because the 
narrative of history is a teacher, the historian has an immense responsibility to lay out 
the narrative faithfully because it will serve in teaching precepts. That is, the one who 
has the power to retell the story has the power of instruction. This is especially true if 
one considers how Hobbes viewed the influence of public authority: "Common-
people's minds [unless they have already been scribbled over by other doctrines or 
teachings] are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by Publique Authority shall 
be imprinted in them" (xxx, 175-179). Hobbes sees that "Common-people's minds," 
then, can often be tainted with the fancies and false histories that have been given to 
them by those in power. This makes it all the more difficult for them to receive 
teachings of any true moral precepts that will lead to salvation and establishing real 
peace, even if these precepts could be known with certainty. The solution, for 
Hobbes, then was to combat this tendency by laying out these precepts, the laws of 
nature, in a way that they can be received, even by common people, by wrapping the 
laws in the form of a pseudo-historical narrative. That is, if there are moral precepts 
that are known with certainty, they must be presented in relation to the success of 
obedience and the failures from disobedience and then placed in the hands of the civil 
sovereign who can turn their teaching into practice (cf. xxxi, 193). To eliminate the 
problems that come with obtaining certainty from historical knowledge or prophecy, 
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Hobbes's solution, then, is not just to lay out any narrative account based on the 
retelling of religious truths or historical events. Instead, he will develop precepts that 
are grounded in the certainty of reason and method and then present them in the 
fashion of a salvation narrative. 
With prophecy out of the question, the primacy of reason in Leviathan is 
evident in how Hobbes compares reason to history and prudence. History, the 
knowledge of facts, is based on the senses and memory with which all human beings 
are born. With experience, one is able to make predictions and gain prudence. 
Reason, different from both of these, is "attained by industry" (v, 21). That is, reason 
is gained through the hard work of correctly naming things and establishing the 
proper connections between facts and definitions to arrive at propositions which are 
certain. 
Noticing the relationship between reason and science is deeply important for 
understanding Hobbes's method. Simply using scientific methodology can still lead 
one down paths of reckoning that may be either certain or uncertain, depending on 
where one begins; reason, however, is grounded in certainty. As Hobbes explains, 
"The Use and End of reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of one, or a 
few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of 
names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence to another. For there 
can be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without a certainty of all those 
Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred" (v, 19). While 
science can be certain or uncertain, reason is based on the certainty of both 
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foundations and method. Any science, to show it is grounded in reason, must then be 
based on accepted definitions, and each of the connected consequences between facts 
must be demonstrable. Therefore, while simple science is the knowledge of 
consequences and is conditional, when aided by reason-that is, when grounded in 
certainty-Hobbes calls it "infallible science." In this way, Hobbes separates wisdom 
into prudence and sapience. 
As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience. For though wee 
usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet the La tines did always 
distinguish between Prudentia and Sapientia, ascribing the former to Experience, the 
later to Science ... both [are] usefull; but the later infallible. But they that trusting 
onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to 
the false rules of the master offence, ventures pra:sumptuously upon an adversary, 
that either kills, or disgraces him. (v, 22) 
While prudence based on experience may be enough for private affairs, science based 
on history is not enough for political theory. What is needed is sapience, which is the 
certainty that can only be found by using a method of infallible science rooted in 
reason (v, 21-22). 
Hobbes later echoes this argument about the relationship between reason and 
prudence. In his discussion about what makes a good counselor, he explains that, 
when a counselor is called on to do something where there are "Infallible rules, (as in 
Engines, and Edifices, the rules of Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot 
equal his Counsel!. .. And when there is no such Rule, he that hath most experience in 
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that particular kind of businesses, has therein the best Judgment, and is the best 
Counsellour" (xxv, 135). 
Hobbes's aim, however, is not just the proper modes or methods of acquiring 
knowledge; it is to establish, both theoretically and practically, salvation. He seeks to 
engineer a political system that will bring about a certain and lasting peace. He must 
create a political system using a method that trumps all other possible ways of 
"knowing" and authorities about what is known. At the root of the warring for power 
and vying for political control and obligations is this exact struggle, to prove that one 
authority and system of knowledge stands above the others. Whichever salvific 
system proves itself to be based on the most authoritative knowledge will be the one 
people will be obligated to obey. 
Hobbes agrees with traditional political and theological philosophies that there 
can be a right ordering for society. Yet, like Descartes, Hobbes aimed to determine 
absolutes by arriving at first principles through the certainty of knowledge found 
within oneself. This means that truths about human nature cannot be forced from the 
' 
outside. Humans cannot be seen as social animals; political leaders cannot appeal to a 
divine right to justify their rule. This is why Hobbes utilizes a scientific methodology 
by adhering to this strict formula of reason and certainty. Unlike Descartes, who 
chose to work out a method a priori, Hobbes chose to use the resolutive-compositive 
method practiced by Harvey and Galilei, which originated in the University of Padua. 
To find true knowledge of something, one resolves it into its most basic parts and 
then builds it back together again into a complex whole. Once several factors in a 
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complex situation have been identified and defined, one is then able to idealize the 
situation and imagine the operation of some factors in isolation from all others. This 
process, when applied to nature, should allow us to arrive at the fundamental causes 
and first principles of any natural phenomenon. 47 This will provide what Hobbes 
needs to develop a sapient-ordering of society that proves more certain than the 
wisdom of prudence or foresight from prophecy. 
That Hobbes used this method is most apparent in the preface to De Cive: 
For as in a watch, or some such small engine, the matter, figure, and motion of the 
wheels cannot well be known, except it be taken in sunder, and viewed in parts; so to 
make a more curious search into the rights of states, and duties of subjects, it is 
necessary, I say, not to take them insunder, but yet that they be so considered, as if 
they were dissolved.48 
This method, then, seems to provide the framework for an intellectual discovery as 
well as the framework that pieces together the narrative form of salvation presented in 
Leviathan. 
It is in this light that one should seek to understand Hobbes's state of nature. 
The state of nature in Leviathan is a thought experiment seeking to dissect society 
into individuals and simply ask the question, "What would life be like without the 
external obligations imposed on individuals from society?" The state of nature is a 
logical (not temporal) beginning point to construct intellectually a society based on 
what can be known with certainty-those things understood through introspection. As 
Pocock puts it, Hobbes seeks to liberate us from Plato's cave by teaching us to argue 
Page45 
for a right order of society by thinking logically rather than diachronically. That is, 
Hobbes constructs a system based on reasoning from premise to consequence rather 
than from historical occurrence to recurrence. 49 It is important, then, to notice that 
Hobbes does not argue about the correct ordering of society-meaning he did not 
consider the ideas of social contracts; obligation, representation, or sovereignty-by 
searching through the histories of ancient governments. Machiavelli had done this in 
his Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy, which included a thorough retelling of 
the Polybian ideas about the most stable forms of government. Instead, Hobbes's 
argument for the correct order of society was based on a logical and philosophical 
development rather than a retelling of historical events. Thus, any evidence that could 
be found from history or religious traditions would be abandoned when engineering 
the order of society. This is especially important since Hobbes needs to construct a 
theory of representation that could stand up against the traditional arguments for the 
"divine right of kings" and the pure liberty of the people ( as he notes in the Epistle 
Dedicatory). 
With prophecy lacking and humanistic sapience more certain than prudence, 
thereby making method more trustworthy than revelation or history, the agenda of 
Leviathan is to replace historical and religious narratives with a scientific-
methodological one. It is no longer acceptable to base the order of society on 
historical knowledge or divine appointment; only Hobbes's new science of politics 
will be acceptable. 
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Society Grounded in Certainty: Fear and the State of Nature 
Hobbes's narrative is humanistic and scientific rather than divinely ordered 
from its very beginning. Hobbes is often, along with Machiavelli, considered a 
founder of modem political liberalism. This is, in part, because his theory argnes that 
the existence of the political order must by justified, rather than assuming it to be a 
natural or divine creation. In this way, the certainty of reasoning and the concept of 
"rights" are together an integral pair in Hobbes's theory. 
As Leo Strauss has pointed out, Hobbes held original views about humanity 
prior to his "distorting them" with scientific "explanations."50 This means that 
Hobbes did not discover the basis and genesis of his theory of selfish human nature 
through using the scientific method but held this view from even before his discovery 
of the effectiveness of scientific explanation. Strauss argnes that Hobbes had to 
choose between using traditional philosophy or modem science to express his views 
about human life. This only makes it all the more important that we notice how 
Hobbes uses resolution to build a heuristic model that answers the question stated 
above, about what life would be like for humans if the external obligations imposed 
on individuals from society were removed. 
No one will deny that the fear of death is a powerful motivation for action. In 
fact, for the political theorist who seeks to turn theory into action (v, 22) and place 
fear at the core of a political theory, one may make great strides at turning ideas into 
reality. 51 That the primacy of fear is vital to the doctrine of Leviathan can be seen in 
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how Hobbes understands the role of reason. It is reason, the infallible science, which 
suggests that a covenant be made among individuals that can save men from a state of 
fear and violence and lead them into a state of peace and security (xiii, 63). Needless 
to say, both sapience and prudence may provide the means to deal with circumstantial 
fear. While prudence, which is wisdom based on experience, may be able to prevent 
disaster temporarily or work to relieve a current problem, only sapience, which is 
infallible wisdom, can handle fear as the inherent problem of the human condition. In 
other words, only the certainty of sapient human reason can result in the 
establishment of a system of security and peace. 
In one of the most telling paragraphs in the entirety of Leviathan, Hobbes 
explains that wisdom comes by "reading men. "52 It is by understanding human nature 
that Hobbes begins, telling us that acquiring wisdom by "reading men" will be 
necessary in order to understand the need for the development of his political theory. 
This apparent reference to the inscription of the Temple of Delphi-knowing 
thyself-must be seen, then, in contrast with other sources of wisdom, in other words, 
the "reading" of books of religion or history. From the philosophical and theological 
questions posed by Hobbes's work, it is imperative that we notice that "reading men" 
is set as the grounding for sapient wisdom, which we have seen Hobbes has placed in 
contrast to prudential wisdom (gained through experience or the study of history) and 
prophecy (gained through divine revelation). 
This grounding also stands in contrast to the traditional "reading" of scripture, 
which is religious history and in contrast to the practice of merely "reading'' 
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philosophy. Instead of reading these sources to gain truth, one must discover truths 
about human nature from what can be "read" in one's own self. Then, whatever 
sapient wisdom can be gained, can then be used to clarify, or even invalidate, the 
"wisdom" that is gained from other source. One should notice how the last paragraph 
of the "Introduction" to Leviathan shows how Hobbes expects his own work to be 
read. It is not the reading of the "works" of scripture of philosophy that is the 
problem; it is their authority. Thus we see, the only authority one can truly rely on for 
sapient wisdom, the only place to find the grounding for certainty, is in "reading 
thyself." 
For Hobbes, it seems that reading oneself provides the self-evident proof of 
that innate fear of death from which humanity ultimately seeks to escape. That is, 
Hobbes conceives of a state of nature which is a state of ultimate fear, especially fear 
of death, where each individual stands vulnerable at the hands of his equals (xiii). 
Yet, Hobbes's natural state is not a state in which humanity is assumed to have ever 
actually lived (xiii, 63). Instead, it is only justified in that individuals who have read 
themselves would verify it through their own experiences. It is an axiom, self-evident 
to all who will consider it. 
In this natural state, humanity is lonely and at the mercy of the harsh realities 
of the fragility oflife. It is a state where the human being is alone in the world, 
subjected to the elements, with nothing for which to give thanks and nothing for 
which to hope. If it can be called a divine creation in any sense, it is a creation 
indifferent to the plight of human poverty and a creation that leaves humanity 
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powerless. Or worse than indifferent, this creation is actually inimical to human 
preservation and prosperity. In this natural state, a Creator cannot be worshiped 
simply for being the Creator, "but from his Irresistable Power" (xxxi, 187). 
Rather than serving as an effective argument for the justification of a natural 
state, when put side by side with the belief in a benevolent God worthy of worship, 
Hobbes's construction of a natural state of solitary and broken humanity appears 
absurd-that is, if one assumes that creation is the work of a benevolent God. Simply 
put, the logical conclusion is that one or both of these positions are false. The first, 
and perhaps most solid argument may be that God does not exist or at least is not 
worthy of worship. This may be, in fact, a major point in Hobbes's argument. As Leo 
Strauss points out, if in the state of nature each individual is at the mercy of the harsh 
and indifferent forces of the universe, then there is no reason to be grateful to its 
"First Cause." If the individual happens to come into good fortune, it will be 
considered an act of human industry rather than divine benevolence. The conclusion 
being that, as far as the question about God's saving power, there are two 
possibilities: 1) God cannot intervene to affect human lives through his own power 
and will-God is not omnipotent and hence cannot change the state of nature into 
something good for evnen his chosen people; or 2) God may be omnipotent but he is 
not good-he is not benevolent. Sti:auss goes further, "Since man is at the mercy of a 
fate utterly unconcerned as to his weal or woe, a fate which one may call God's 
irresistible power, because man experiences only force, and not kindness from the 
overwhelming power of the universe, he has no choice but to help himself."53 In other 
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words, it is inconceivable that human beings in Hobbes's hellish state of nature would 
consider the Creator of their situation worthy ofworship.54 Thus, Hobbes's theory 
begins with a deep understanding of human nature, understood through human 
reasoning, and it is up to humanity to do something about its horrible but natural 
predicament. 
If we compare the state of nature---which is a state of fear-to what Hobbes 
also says about memory, imagination, and beliefs, we find that fear provides more 
than the grounding that leads individuals to reason their way to salvation. In fact, 
Hobbes's definition of religion is that it is rooted in fear. "Peare of power invisible, 
feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed [is called] RELIGION; 
not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when the power imagined, is truly such as we 
imagine, TRUE RELIGION" (vi, 26). Those who are curious and love to know the 
causes of things and "make any profound enquiry into natural causes" will arrive at 
the conclusion that there is a first cause, which is God (xi, 51 ). Therefore, in a state of 
natural fear and turmoil, this first cause is the cause of fear. 
What might this "true religion" be, if not a religion based on the dreaded state 
Hobbes imagines to be the returning to the ultimate state of fear and death that he · 
proposed to be the state of nature? As Edwin Curley argues, for Hobbes, curiosity in 
searching for first causes is the root of monotheism, while fear of invisible powers is 
the origin of polytheism. 55 What this discussion has shown, however, is that even 
Hobbes's "First Cause" puts humanity in a fearful state from which it is in desperate 
need of salvation. 
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Asking the question what individuals would look like in a state of nature, 
apart from the safety and benefits of social order, leads to fear and deprivation. If God 
is worthy of worship, then might human beings be naturally suited for society? In 
other words, a third possibility that one might consider is that Hobbes has done a 
severe injustice by removing humanity from its natural social environment, showing 
what it would look like ifhumans were individuals and removed from the benefits of 
community. It is clear, however, that Hobbes's did believe that human beings were 
inherently individuals. His theory of representation clearly opposes the divine right of 
kings. Similarly, he gives six reasons why humans are not political animals as 
Aristotle presents them. 56 
There is yet something deeper here one may miss in the argument between 
those who claim to understand Hobbes and his opponents. What the nature and 
character of human beings would be, had they been created as lonely individuals, thus 
making life hellishly unlivable and God unworthy of worship, only serve to show that 
the state of nature is not a state to which human beings belong. 57 Politically, it is an 
argument that provides the fundamental purpose underlying the kinds of social 
structures which safeguard against falling into such a state of chaos and war. Morally, 
it is an argument supporting the kind of relationships humans must have with each 
other to ensure safety and appropriately respond to the innate fear of violence and 
death that appear to govern the human soul. But theologically, it is an ultimatum. If 
human beings were created in a state of nature, as Hobbes's presents, and can create a 
society that safeguards against the calamities of human nature, then God is no longer 
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needed, neither in the state of nature nor in the artificial state Hobbes has engineered. 
Perhaps more importantly, it suggests that humans are not only socially broken but 
are left to live in anguish and fear without the guidance of reason. Hobbes's theory is 
to provide the certainty with which a state of security can exist and through which 
humanity can be saved from violence and fear. Thus, sapience, which is humanistic 
science rooted in the self-evident truth of human nature, not only calls one to begin 
reasoning from an imagined state of hell on earth but methodically paves the way for 
an entirely human instituted salvation from that state. 
Salvation Secured through Obligation 
The next stage in the salvation narrative of Leviathan is that individuals move 
from the state of fear and war to the state of security by covenanting with each other. 
Through this covenant is established the "leviathan" that stands as a system of 
sovereignty which has been given the right to rule by the individuals of the 
commonwealth having laid down their own rights in order to escape the state of 
nature. Hobbes calls his leviathan the "Mortall God'' (xvii, 87). 
In essence, Hobbes's state is able to come in and use reason to solve the 
problems of human nature. It has been conceived ofby Hobbes through a process of 
calculation and is itself presented to be created in reality through a process of 
calculation. This mortal god, through the process of reason, has transformed the 
animals that irrational and selfish individuals would present themselves to be into 
human beings. Thus, it is through leviathan that peace comes. Peace is not something 
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that has been given by a divine act or something that could be found in nature. Rather, 
this peace is something that came about only through human action, the formation of 
a social contract. Thus, this mortal god transforms animals into human beings. This 
happens in distinct stages. First, humanity is irrational and chaotic (merely animals). 
Next, individuals are led by reason to join in a covenant with each other. Finally, a 
government is established with laws and order that brings salvation by making 
individuals obligated to live in peace with one another. While other political theories 
have considered civil order as the protector of the peace, Hobbes's mortal god is the 
creator of it. 58 
Only after Hobbes has established the narrative of salvation in Leviathan, its 
transformative and creative messianic role, does he present a system of obligation and 
representation. That is, there is a necessary relationship between salvation and· 
obedience. Prior to the initiation of the covenant of every individual with every other, 
all "laws" are merely precepts and dispositions. It is only after the commonwealth is 
established that precepts of reason can be understood as laws (xxvi, 141). Stated 
another way, humanity is naturally predisposed to peace because it is fearful and, in 
the state of nature, desperate for salvation. Once salvation is on the horizon, 
individuals will make every endeavor to secure it by keeping laws and agreements. 
Law is obligation, (xiv, 67) and individuals are obligated to obey the law because 
they have made a covenant in the expectation that it will save them. They have given 
up their individual roles as the protectors and saviors of themselves ( exchanged their 
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natural rights) to leviathan, who will be their savior and provide the safety and 
security they desperately seek. 
Obligation qua Salvation. It is important to notice that individuals are 
obligated to obey the laws because salvation has come and, through their obedience, 
is able to be secured. As Hobbes explains, the bonds of the covenant are not easily 
broken; it is not due to the strength of the words of the covenant, because words are 
easily broken, but because the fear of evil and consequences that will result from 
disobedience (xiv, 65). These are not simply the evil consequences due to the 
punishments and rewards that are controlled by the sovereign. It is not obedience qua 
obedience, nor is it obedience qua fear of punishment. Obligation to the covenant 
comes from the knowledge that one has received salvation. If obligation is related to 
fear, it is the fear of returning to the hell from whence humanity began. As Carl 
Schmitt puts it, if Hobbes's theory simply brought people from the fear and violence 
of the sµite of nature into a fear and violence of sovereign, then this theory would be 
absurd. 59 The obligation presented in the state theory of Leviathan is obedience qua 
salvation. 
!lepresentation qua Salvation. It is at this point that Hobbes presents his 
theory ofrepresentation. As it has already been pointed out, one of the main problems 
Hobbes is dealing with is the competition of authority. Therefore, it must be clear 
who holds the ultimate authority; in other words, who is the real representative of 
salvation? Who is the real savior? If Hobbes thought the sectarian conflict that had 
arisen among the various competing religious leaders who claimed divine authority to 
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lead the people had been the root of the English civil war, then the solution must be to 
show which claimant to authority was the securer of real salvation. 
As was mentioned earlier, just relegating Christian salvation to a future period 
and claiming that God's saving power is held off until a future "world to come" is not 
enough to deter political chaos. As the example of Sir Thomas More showed, the 
belief in a future salvation can be all the more reason for someone to deny his or her 
obligation to the civil sovereign. This is how Hobbes's theory of representation serves 
the overall theoretical aims. 
If the clergy claim a separate authority from the civil sovereign, then the 
possibility arises for conflict. Preachers and teachers of all kinds may be capable of 
stirring up trouble and inciting violence by laying claim to people's loyalty to 
something beyond the immediate political reality. Individuals like Sir Thomas More 
are able to claim allegiance to a spiritual authority and, even to death, deny the final 
authority of the civil sovereign. Therefore, what Hobbes must ultimately do is 
undermine the authority of the clergy and show that the civil sovereign is the true 
representative of effectual salvation, both political and theological. One method for 
doing this has already been discussed, insofar as Hobbes has argued, that the current 
time is the period of regeneration when God does not speak. Therefore, we cannot 
know God's will. For Hobbes, that does not mean that God's-authority cannot be 
represented. 
In the sixteenth chapter of Leviathan, Hobbes puts forth his theory of 
representation (xvi, 80-83). Individuals that speak or act for themselves are "natural 
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persons." Hobbes makes the distinction between "natural persons" and "artificial 
persons." Artificial persons are persons or things that are represented by the words 
and the actions of another (xvi, 80). Thus, Hobbes lists several things that are 
represented by "artificial persons," which are not natural persons but can nevertheless 
be personated. In listing "artificial persons," Hobbes discusses inanimate objects, 
irrational humans, false gods, the true God, and the multitude. 
It appears that the most important artificial person Hobbes wants to present is 
sovereignty. The representative of the sovereign, however, is actually presented last 
in Hobbes's list. As individuals, people may be considered the authors of their own 
actions. But in considering a collective people, Hobbes's discussion about 
representation is much more interesting. 
A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, 
Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in 
particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, 
that maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but 
one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude. (xvi, 82) 
What exactly is meant when one talks about the will or the actions of "the people?" 
The will or actions of a multitude, for Hobbes, can only be considered when the 
individuals come together and become a unity. This unity, however, is not the unity 
of the people who are "the Represented," but "it is the Unity of the Representer'! (the 
sovereign). This happens when they give the authority to the representative to act on 
their behalf. Thus, "the people", for Hobbes, can only will or act when it is done 
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through a representative. That is, "the people" is but one person-since it is the 
representative ( either the sovereign or the prearranged decision-making mechanism, 
such as a majority in an assembly) that bears the personhood of the people. As 
interesting as this theory of representation is, what is most telling, however, is the 
progression of the list of artificial persons as Hobbes presents them. 
It begins very directly. Hobbes discusses that inanimate objects such as 
churches, hospitals, and bridges cannot be authors of actions, but someone can be 
given the authority to act on their behalf to maintain them, such as their owners or 
governors. Those who act on the behalf of inanimate objects are said to personate 
them and thus be their representatives. It is similarly straightforward that next Hobbes 
discusses the animate but irrational: children, fools, and those who are mad. (While 
Hobbes does discuss whether animals can be personated, surely they would fit here in 
the list as animate but irrational beings.) Because these individuals cannot be 
expected to use reason, they are not considered to be the authors of their own 
actions-and can therefore be personated. What is interesting is that next Hobbes 
considers false gods. Again, false gods cannot be considered the authors of their own 
actions ( assumedly because they cannot act), and thus can be personated. 
We should notice that before Hobbes discusses the representative of the 
commonwealth, it is rather clever that Hobbes includes the true God in this list of 
things that can be artificially personated. Bridges, children, and idols must be 
artificially personated because they either cannot act or do not have the means of 
being rationally responsible for their actions. They cannot, therefore, be considered 
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the author of their actions. Hobbes makes it clear, however, that they cannot be 
personated until after the covenant has been made and a civil state comes into 
existence. That the "True God" fits on this list only highlights the fact that Hobbes 
sees God as absent and inactive. Therefore, God can be personated and may have a 
representative but does not intervene directly in political situations. But in what way 
and by whom can God be personated? 
Hobbes explains that the word for church in scripture was Ecclesia. He 
explains that this was the same word that was used to refer to the Grecian 
commonwealths. In this sense, the only way that the church can have commands, 
wills, orders, or actions is when it is taken for one person, following Hobbes's 
understanding of representation. As he explains, "I define a CHURCH to be, A 
company of men professing Christian Religion, united in the person of one Soveraign; 
at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought 
not to assemble" (xxxix, 247b-248b).60 
In the same vein, Hobbes explains that a grave mistake is often made when 
people confuse the spiritual and temporal authority. 
Temporal/ and Spiritual/ Government, are but two words brought into the 
world, to make men see double, and mistake their Lawful/ Soveraign. It is true, that 
the bodies of the faithfull, after the Resurrection shall be not onely Spirituall, but 
Etemall; but in this life they are grosse, and corruptible. There is therefore no other 
Government in this life, neither of State, nor Religion, but Temporall; nor teaching of 
any doctrine, lawfull to any Subject, which the Govemour both of the State, and of 
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the Religion, forbiddeth to be taught: And that Governor must be one; or else there 
must needs follow Faction, and Civil war in the Common-wealth, between the 
Church and State; between Spiritualists, and Temporalists; between the Sword Of 
Justice, and the Shield Of Faith; and (which is more) in every Christian mans own 
brest, between the Christian, and the Man. (xxxix, 248b) 
Again, this serves to show that peace and security in political life depend on 
leviathan. The only standard of justice available is determined by the governor. The 
only authority is a united authority, where "both of the State, and of the Religion," are 
together, and the "Governor must be one." The warning, Hobbes explains, could be 
simply restated in that, by arguing that one is obligated to follow God's authority at 
the expense of the sovereign, one has chosen to forsake the salvation that has been 
provided through the leviathan without recognizing that the civil sovereign must also 
hold the authority as the representative of the church, and therefore God, if the 
commonwealth is to remain secure. 
In this way, obedience to God and the civil sovereign are not inconsistent, 
whether the sovereign is a Christian or an infidel (xliii, 330-31). While Hobbes's 
theory of salvation may seem minimalistic, he explains that there are two important 
things that are necessary for salvation, "Faith in Christ, and Obedience to Laws." 
Obedience to the laws would be enough for salvation, at least in terms of particular 
salvation through civil security and peace, yet "Remission of sins for the time past" is 
needed for general salvation which now simply has no impact on the current life 
whatsoever (xliii, 322). 
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Laviat/1anian Narrative Logic and Order. Thus far, we have seen that the 
narrative of Leviathan presents a story of salvation in the following stages: 1) the 
state of nature is chaos and war; 2) reason leads individuals to join in covenant with 
each other, establishing a sovereign and bringing salvation; 3) the individuals in the 
commonwealth are obligated to uphold the covenant and obey the laws of the 
commonwealth because they bring safety and security; 4) the sovereign represents the 
unity that is brought about through the covenant which extends to include both 
religious and political authority and unite them in one person. 
Ifhe is successfully to undermine the authority of the clergy yet present the 
sovereign as the representative of both the state and the church, Hobbes needs to 
show that the relationship between salvation and obligation follows the same order 
and logic in scripture as it does with the narrative presented by his theory. That is, the 
authority and obligation to obedience must come as a result of the establishment of 
the civil sovereignty and salvation from chaos and war. Therefore, it is essential to the 
narrative of Leviathan that Hobbes presents a full explanation of not only political but 
also religious salvation. 
Hobbes's Political Salvation and Its Theological Competition 
Before exploring Hobbes's discussion of the Hebrew narrative of salvation, it 
will be helpful to compare more fully Hobbes's position on political salvation with 
the traditional theological view of salvation. With the Leviathanian salvation 
narrative, political salvation requires that the civil sovereign be the highest source of 
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authority, the sole source of protection, and that the sovereign's establishment 
depends on a covenant made between each individual that ends the chaotic state of 
nature. A competing theological picture of salvation in the stories of Israel's history 
which Hobbes certainly understood, as has already been discussed, sees that God is 
the sole protector and that it is the covenant made with God that establishes God's 
sovereignty. 
The political narrative shows that the sovereign must be the representative of 
the people and instituted by them, not God. Salvation, then, is rooted in a civil 
agreement that ensures safety an<;! protection, without which there is no obligation. 
Obligation is simply to the sovereign. Obligation to God only exists if the religion 
that has been established by the sovereign so commands it. The biblical narrative, it 
will be shown, presents a fundamentally opposing picture of God's sovereignty. It is a 
picture that is, however, very similar to Hobbes's narrative of political salvation. It 
presents God as being worthy of obedience under the same reasoning Hobbes argues 
for political obligation. Similarly, scripture presents God's laws as obligatory, not 
because of God's irresistible power, but for the reason that Israel had made a 
covenant to obey God because God had provided the safety and security that brought 
about Israel's deliverance and salvation. Similarly, miracles were not used primarily 
to prove that a prophet was legitimate but to play a major role in bringing about the 
salvation oflsrael. This will be shown by examining the exact same passages from 
the Hebrew narrative upon which Hobbes himself chooses to focus his attention: the 
exodus story and the Ten Commandments. 
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The Egyptian Revolution 
It has already been discussed that Hobbes sees the current period as a period 
of regeneration where miracles and divine revelation to private individuals have 
ceased. Hobbes argues that scripture has taken the place of divine revelation in the 
current period (xxxii, 198). It is clear that this has not always been the case. If the 
Hebrew Scriptures are to be read and believed to have authority, miracles and divine 
revelation did play a significant role in the scriptural narrative of salvation. Where the 
first half of Leviathan draws on reason to construct a civil commonwealth, the second 
half draws insight from scripture to gain instruction for the ordering of Christian 
commonwealths. For this reason, Hobbes begins directly in the thirty-second chapter 
by discussing scripture and miracles. 
To establish his understanding of the doctrine of miracles as presented in 
scripture, Hobbes discusses the warnings about false prophets and their seditious 
nature from the book of Deuteronomy. 
If one Prophet deceive another, what certainty is there of knowing the will of God, by 
other way than that of Reason? To which I answer out of the Holy Scripture, that 
there be two marks, by which together, not asunder, a true Prophet is to be known. 
One is the doing of miracles; the other is the not teaching any other Religion than that 
which is already established. Asunder (I say) neither of these is sufficient. (Deut. 13 
v. 1,2,3,4,5) If a Prophet rise amongst you, or a Dreamer of dreams, and shall 
pretend the doing of a miracle, and the miracle come to passe; if he say, Let us follow 
strange Gods, which thou hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to him, &c. But that 
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Prophet and Dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he hath spoken to you 
to Revolt from the Lord your God. In which words two things are to be observed, 
First, that God wil not have miracles alone serve for arguments, to approve the 
Prophets calling; but ( as it is in the third verse) for an experiment of the constancy 
of our adherence to himself. For the works of the Egyptian Sorcerers, though not so 
great as those of Moses, yet were great miracles. Secondly, that how great soever the 
miracle be, yet if it tend to stir up revolt against the King, or him that governeth by 
the Kings authority, he that doth such miracle, is not to be considered otherwise than 
as sentto make triall of their allegiance. For these words, revolt from the Lord your 
God, are in this place equivalent to revolt from your King. For they had made God 
their King by pact at the foot of Mount Sinai; who ruled them by Moses only; for he 
only spake with God, and from time to time declared Gods Commandements to the 
people. (xxxii, 197-italics in original, bold added for emphasis) 
Clearly, Hobbes wants us to see that miracles are dangerous because they can stir up a 
revolt against the sovereign's authority. To solve this problem, as has already been 
explained, Hobbes's quote from Deuteronomy 13 is meant to argue that a prophet is 
known through doing miracles and adhering to the teaching of the already established 
religion. Similarly, Hobbes equates the phrase "revolt from the Lord your God'' to 
"revolt from your King." This is at the core of how Hobbes seeks to reconcile faith 
and political power. For the biblical people oflsrael, Hobbes supports this 
substitution with the evidence that Israel had made God their king at Mount Sinai. 
However, one should pay close attention to the example Hobbes specifically uses 
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about the use of miracles as a part of the competition between the Egyptian sorcerers 
and Moses from the salvation narrative presented in passages from Exodus . 
. First, it should be noted that Hobbes is either being intentionally deceptive or 
making some indirect suggestion with his example in claiming that prophets who use 
miracles to encourage sedition should not be trusted. He explicitly states that no 
matter "how great soever the miracle be, yet if it tend to stir up revolt against the 
King, or him that governeth by the King's authority, he that doth such miracle" is not 
to be considered a prophet of God, but sent to trial for sedition. Yet, Hobbes knows 
that the people oflsrael-not yet having made the covenant with God at Mount Sinai 
until after they had left Egypt-were subjects of the sovereign of Egypt and that the 
miracles performed by the power of God through Moses were intended as explicit 
acts of sedition against the power of the Pharaoh in order to bring about their 
salvation. This is clear in the exodus narrative as it recounts God's instructions to 
Moses: "And the Egyptians shall know that I am the LORD, when I stretch forth mine 
hand upon Egypt, and.bring out the children oflsrael from among them" (Exodus 
7:5). On the surface, it appears that Hobbes simply uses the concept of salvation in a 
way that also reframes the relationship between political and theological salvation. 
With a bit more reflection, it is clear that he has reframed the relationship between 
political and theological salvation in a way that tames the original theological nature 
of salvation, making it malleable so that its seditious nature could be examined. 
Secondly, it should be noted that Hobbes uses a rhetorical sleight-of-hand 
even with his way of discussing the role of miracles. Hobbes seems to imply that the 
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role of miracles is simply to "serve as arguments, to approve the prophet's calling." 
However, it is clear that the intended purpose of the miracles in the Exodus narrative 
was not so much aimed at convincing the people oflsrael to follow Moses but at 
convincing Pharaoh that his rule was not the ultimate sovereign and that he musr set 
the people oflsrael free. Simply put, the miracles of the Exodus narrative were aimed 
at presenting Yahweh as both supreme and active sovereign and therefore Israel's 
God of salvation. This is made clear in the songs of Moses and Israel, sang after the 
people oflsrael had been rescued from Egypt: "I will sing unto the LORD, for he hath 
triumphed gloriously: the horse and his rider hath he thrown into the sea. The LORD is 
my strength and song, and he is become my salvation" (Exodus 15:1-2). Moses was 
effectively preaching a new religion to Pharoah, which violates one of the roles, 
according to Hobbes, that confirms a prophet is true. Moreover, Pharaoh's reaction to 
Moses could be seen as acting entirely in accord with Hobbes's teaching-that 
prophets who stir up revolt are not true prophets. According to Hobbes's teaching, 
those who stir up revolt are not true prophets and should be put to death. According to 
Levaithan, Pharaoh's failure was that he did not try Moses for sedition and have him 
put to death. 
Thirdly, Hobbes's use of substitution has clearly rearranged the chronolqgical 
ordering of the exodus narrative. Hobbes tells us that the substitution of the phrase 
"revolt from the Lord your God'' for the supposedly equivalent "revolt from your 
King" is logical because Israel "had made God their King by pact at the foot of Mount 
Sinai." This is not the case, however. Israel had not made God its king until later in 
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the narrative. According to Hobbes's logic, after being freed from Egypt, the people 
oflsrael were in a state of nature and war. Perhaps one would suggest that Moses had 
been chosen to be their sovereign or that God had been their sovereign all along, 
Hobbes, however, explicitly says in his discussion of the Ten Commandments that 
until Mount Sinai "there was no written Law of God" (xiii, 281). 
While Hobbes will explain later that, while Abraham was not considered a 
king, it was with him that the covenant was made which was renewed at Mount 'Sinai. 
He explains that the contract between God and Abraham was the act that made 
Abraham and posterity subjected to God's positive law (xxxv, 217). Moreover, 
Hobbes also points to Exodus 18, recounting for his reader the fact that Moses 
"following the counsell of Jethro his Father-in-law, did appoint Judges, and Officers 
over the people, such as feared God; and of these, were those Seventy, whom God by 
putting upon them Moses spirit, inclined to aid Moses in the Administration of the 
Kingdome" (xxxvi, 229-30). Yet Hobbes will want to convince us that "That part of 
the Scripture, which was first Law, was the Ten Commandements, written in two 
' 
Tables of Stone, and delivered by God himselfe to Moses; and by Moses made known 
to the people. Before that time there was no written Law of God, who as yet having 
not chosen any people to bee his peculiar Kingdome, had given no Law to men, but 
the Law ofNature, that is to say, the Precepts ofNaturall Reason, written in every 
mans own heart" (xiii, 281). So, one must ask whether Hobbes considers Israel to 
have been God's chosen people, "God's peculiar Kingdom," prior to the giving of the 
Ten Commandments, or not. 
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In order to make his discussion consistent, Hobbes could have simply stated 
that Israel had been a peculiar kingdom from the time of Abraham. What seems clear 
is that Hobbes expects his readers to assume that the miracles performed by Moses, 
who was the representative of God to Pharaoh, were not acts of sedition because the 
people of Israel were subjects of the positive kingdom of God, not Pharaoh. A quick 
review of the narrative makes it clear, however, that from the time that Joseph 
provided food for his brothers and the people of Israel, they had made Egypt their 
dwelling even as they expected God would someday return them to their homeland 
(Genesis 50: 21-26). If followed to its logical conclusion, however, acknowledging 
this simple fact would undermine Hobbes's project. On the surface, Hobbes wants it 
to be clear that, at least in the current period of regeneration, there is no possibility 
whatsoever that there can be a people whose God is active and able to bring about the 
kind of absolute salvation Hobbes described in a way that is contrary to the civil 
salvation brought about through the certainty of reason which has been set up through 
his political theory. Reflecting on this example, however, makes one ask why Hobbes 
has chosen this particular scripture. In fact, it would have simply been easier to 
choose the exodus narrative as an example of how religion can undermine civil 
authority. Explicitly doing this, however, would do more than turn martyrs like Sir 
Thomas More into political trouble makers-it would reveal the entire foundation of 
Hebrew and Christian faith as a seditious nightmare for any kind of civil society that 
does not rely on the kind of divine intervention and miraculous power displayed by 
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the Hebrew God for his people. Perhaps this is Hobbes's intention, revealed only to 
his more careful readers. 
The Ten Seditious Commandments 
Similarly, it is important to notice the role that Moses and the Ten 
Commandments play in Hobbes's retelling of the exodus narrative compared with the 
actual text of the narrative itself. This is important not only because Hobbes claims 
that this is the first part of scripture that became positive law but precisely because 
they are the laws that deal with God's sovereignty, the worship of foreign gods,'and 
what makes the commandments of God obligatory. 
That part of the Scripture, which was first Law, was the Ten Commandements, 
written in two Tables of Stone, and delivered by God himselfe to Moses; and by 
Moses made known to the people. Before that time there was no written Law of God, 
who as yet having not chosen any people to bee his peculiar Kingdome, had given no 
Law to men, but the Law ofNature, that is to say, the Precepts ofNaturall Reason, 
written in every mans own heart. Of these two Tables, the first containeth the law of 
Soveraignty; I. That they should not obey, nor honour the Gods of other Nations, in 
these words, Non habebis Deos alienos coram me, that is, Thou shalt not have for 
Gods, the Gods that other Nations worship; but onely me: whereby they were 
forbidden to obey, or honor, as their King and Governour, any other God, than him 
that spalce unto them then by Moses, and afterwards by the High Priest. 2. That they 
should not make any Image to represent him; that is to say, they were not to choose 
to themselves, neither in heaven, nor in earth, any Representative of their own 
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fancying, but obey Moses and Aaron, whom he had appointed to that office. 3. That 
they should not take the Name of God in vain; that is, they should not speak rashly of 
their King, nor dispute his Right, nor the commissions of Moses and Aaron, his 
Lieutenants. 4. That they should every Seventh day abstain from their ordinary 
labour, and employ that time in doing him Publique Honor. The second Table 
containeth the Duty of one man towards another, as To honor Parents; Not to kill; 
Not to Commit Adultery; Not to steale; Not to corrupt Judgment by false witnesse; 
and finally, Not so much as to designe in their heart the doing of any injury one to 
another. The question now is, Who it was that gave to these written Tables the 
obligatory force of Lawes. There is no doubt but that they were made Laws by God 
himselfe: But because a Law obliges not, nor is Law to any, but to them that 
acknowledge it to be the act of the Soveraign, how could the people oflsrael that 
were forbidden to approach the Mountain to hear what God said to Moses, be obliged 
to obedience to all those laws which Moses propounded to them? Some of them were 
indeed the Laws of Nature, as all the Second Table; and therefore to be 
acknowledged for Gods Laws; not to the Israelites alone, but to all people: But of 
those that were peculiar to the Israelites, as those of the first Table, the question 
remains; saving that they had obliged themselves, presently after the propounding of 
them, to obey Moses, in these words (Exod. 20.19.) Speak them thou to us, and we 
will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die. It was therefore onely Moses 
then, and after him the High Priest, whom (by Moses) God declared should 
administer this his peculiar Kingdome, that had on Earth, the power to make this 
short Scripture of the Decalogue to bee Law in the Common-wealth oflsrael. But 
Page70 
Moses, and Aaron, and the succeeding High Priests were the Civill Soveraigns. 
Therefore hitherto, the Canonizing, or making of the Scripture Law, belonged t,o the 
Civill Soveraigne. (xiii, 281-82) 
In an earlier discussion in chapter thirty-six about the word of God, Hobbes 
had defined the word of God and made an important distinction between words 
spoken by God and words spoken about God. In discussing the word of God in 
relation to the Ten Commandments, Hobbes goes on to break these down further. 
Scripture-which is holy history-is the word of God in one sense; God's power, 
wisdom, and decree is the word of God in a metaphorical sense; God's words spoken 
to his prophets is yet another and the proper sense. Hobbes goes on to clarify, "For 
example, though these words, I am the Lord thy God, &c. to the end of the Ten 
Commandments, were spoken by God to Moses; yet the preface, God spake these 
words and said, is to be understood for the words of him that wrote the holy history" 
( xxxvi, 223 ). This is important in our discussion of the passage about the Ten 
Commandments from chapter forty-two quoted above because Hobbes tacitly 
acknowledges that the commandments begin not with "Non habebis Deas alienos 
coram me," but with "I am the Lord thy God ... " Perhaps, even more importantly, in 
neither instance does Hobbes include the rest of the sentence which continues, "I am 
the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt" (Exodus 20:2). 
Hobbes does, however, mention this important part of the narrative when recounting 
that the people of Israel had committed idolatry and worshiped the golden calf as their 
savior, rather than God (xiv, 363). In this particular passage from Hobbes, if it had 
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been acknowledged that the commandments begin with a statement that God had 
saved Israel out of the land of Egypt, the contrast between Israel's God and the 
Pharaoh would be apparent. In other words, Hobbes would have presented obedience 
to the Pharaoh, the sovereign of Egypt, as idolatry, thus making Pharaoh a false 
savior in the same way as scripture presented the golden calf and obedience to the 
Hebrew God would have been shown to be in direct conflict with Hobbes's own 
theory. 
The first commandment. In describing the Ten Commandments, Hobbes 
separates them into two categories ( or tables). The laws of sovereignty are on the first 
table; the laws of duty are on the second. In recounting the first commandment, 
Hobbes acknowledges that the commandment is aimed at separating Israel from other 
nations in that the people of Israel "should not obey, nor honor the gods of other 
nations." In Hobbes's view, however, this is aimed at maintaining the established 
authority of the sovereign. While they are clearly laws written by God, Hobbes 
explains, they only became obligatory and thus only truly became laws once it was 
decreed by the civil sovereign. This is because, as has been discussed already, laws 
are only obligatory when one has given over rights to a sovereign through a social 
contract. Just as the natural laws are not obligatory in any real sense until a sovereign 
is set up, the Ten Commandments could not be obligatory until God had made a 
direct covenant with Israel. 
Hobbes explains that the Ten Commandments became obligatory for the 
people oflsrael when they set Moses up to be their civil sovereign. If this were the 
Page 72 
case before Sinai (as Hobbes falsely presents here), this means that they were 
rebellious, seditious subjects prior to leaving Egypt. When the people oflsrael had 
declared, "Speak them thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, 
lest we die," they had chosen Moses to be their leader. Yet, as we have already seen, 
Hobbes knew Moses had set up a system of judges at the advice of Jethro and thus 
had been their leader even before the establishing of the commandments. In the 
passage from chapter thirty-two quoted above, Hobbes clearly acknowledges that 
Aaron, along with Moses, had been appointed to the office of lieutenants. Would 
Israel not simply have been following the direction of Aaron, who himself was the 
one to fashion the gold into the image of a calf (Exodus 32: 1-4)? At this time, 
however, because Moses had not yet brought down the Ten Commandments from the 
mountain, it cannot be said that Israel disobeyed the first and second commandments 
retrospectively. Nevertheless, Israel was punished and three thousand died (Exodus 
32:27-29). All of this occurs even before God had given any positive law to Israel 
through Moses. Strictly speaking, according to Hobbes's teaching, this clearly makes 
God's punishment unjust. 
It is also important to notice the peculiar way Hobbes has interpreted this first 
commandment. Instead of quoting from the King James English, "Thou shalt have no 
other gods before me," he quotes the Latin, "Non habebis Deos alienos coram me. " 
Hobbes has not used the Latin version to quote any of the other commandments. It 
would seem that the purpose for this odd choice is that he wants to translate the word 
alienos as referring specifically to "gods of other nations," rather than the "no other 
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gods" from the King James translation. Certainly, this does seem to match with the 
rendering of the English word 'alien'. The original Hebrew word ini:c, however, can 
mean 'another' or 'strange.' The reason this is important is that this commandment to 
have "no other gods" could have easily included sovereigns that demanded allegiance 
before the Hebrew God. Since dealing with the disputation between the authority of 
God and the sovereign is at the heart of what Hobbes is aiming to address, this 
passage must be clarified completely as fitting under the scheme of the salvation 
narrative presented by Leviathan. In other words, alienos must explicitly be translated 
to mean 'alien' and not 'other,' 'strange,' 'gentile,' 'pagan,' or 'false,' as would have 
been clearly understood from the normal Hebraic understanding of the 
commandment. Otherwise, the first commandment would be universally applicable to 
all, not just the Israelites. This becomes particularly important in relation to the 
second commandment, since making the distinction between false gods and foreign 
gods rules out the possibility that worshiping or honoring a pagan king can be 
somehow seen as a form of idolatry. Another way to put it is that this commandment 
loses all political force except that Hobbes wants to use it to argue that keeping 
faithful to the sovereign and preventing sedition, a major component of his own 
theory, is consistent with the biblical narrative. Therefore, actions like those of Sir 
Thomas More are to be seen as inconsistent with scripture and thus cannot be 
considered martyrdom (xiii, 272). Alternatively, for those who are thinking this 
through, the parts of the Hebrew Scriptures that Hobbes selects seem to indicate that 
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the relationship between the Israelites and their God as presented in the Biblical 
narrative is not consistent with sound political teaching. 
One should compare the way Hobbes understand this commandment and the 
rest of the entire narrative of the Hebrew Scriptures. While it would be beyond the 
space of the current discussion to point out every such instance where obedience to 
the established civil sovereign was considered idolatry and Hebrew adherence to the 
first and second commandments brought about political problems with pagan 
authorities, several individual stories come to mind. Take for instance the charge 
against the Jews and their refusal to bow to and worship the golden image of king 
Nebuchadnezzar in Babylon; this passage included the famous story of the salvation 
ofShadrach, Meshach, and Abednego.61 Similarly, consider the story of the book of 
Esther. The conflict in this entire story begins because Mordecai, who had been given 
a prominent position in the court of King Ahasuerus, would not bow down before 
Haman the Agagite. Haman thus accused the entire race of the Jews, charging that 
"There is a certain people scattered abroad and dispersed among the people in all the 
provinces of thy kingdom; and their laws are diverse from all people; neither keep 
they the king's laws."62 
It may be argued that these are stories where the Jews lived in foreign lands. 
There are, however, several examples of prophets who challenged the "established 
authority'' oflsrael. One example might be the story of the prophet Elijah who King 
Ahab called the ''troubler of Israel."63 Elijah was rightly given this title, according to 
the Hebrew text, because, on behalf of Yahweh he challenged the worship of the 
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Baal. Baal is a prime example of a "foreign" God that had been sanctioned under the 
authority of Jezebel. With Hobbes's rendering and interpretation of the Latin Non 
habebis Deos alienos coram me as "Thou shalt not have for gods, the gods that other 
nations," the story of the prophet Elijah becomes ridiculous. The story of Elijah ends 
with the victory of Yahweh in a challenge with Jezebel's pagan priests on Mt. 
Caramel, eventually ending in their slaughter.64 Similarly, Elijah prophesied the death 
of King Ahab because he had murdered Naboth.65 
Clearly, for Hobbes, it was important to describe that the current period is a 
time of regeneration where God is not active and the power of the prophet has been 
emasculated. Should a modem reader of the story of Elijah assume that divine 
revelation were possible, Hobbes's entire theory would break down and the sovereign 
would always be in fear of judgment for requiring worship by his subjects (as with 
the stories in Daniel and Esther) or establishing a religion that stands in competition 
with the Hebrew God. 
This first commandment strikes at the core of Hobbes's theory. In relation to 
the first commandment, Hobbes explains that the desire to change one's government 
is like the breaching of this commandment. That is, even if people seek to reform the 
commonwealth, by their disobedience they will find that they have destroyed it. The 
prosperity and success of a government is not dependent, for Hobbes, on whether it is 
aristocratic or democratic, but specifically on its ability to maintain order and 
obedience. "Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the 
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Concord of the People,) and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be 
dissolved" (xxx, 177; cf. xiv, 357). 
Again, a deeper second reading reveals that Hobbes clearly means to draw 
attention to more than he says on the surface. There is no doubt that the entire first 
commandment is contrary to Hobbes's theory of political salvation. In the passage 
from chapter thirty-six, Hobbes had made the distinction between the preface and the 
actual words of God. In saying so, he explains that "I am the Lord thy God, &c. to the 
end of the Ten Commandments" were the words of God, and that the beginning of the 
Ten Commandments began with "I am the Lord thy God" This is important because 
Hobbes has led his readers to believe that his aim in discussing the Ten 
Commandments is to supply the reasoning behind what made the commandments 
obligatory as law. Once the laws are obligatory, then the people oflsrael can be seen 
as constituting a kingdom with positive laws. In essence, by accepting the Ten 
Commandments as laws, the nation of Israel is born as a positive kingdom. However, 
hidden in the exact wording he has failed to present the reasoning for the laws being 
obligatory was not because Israel had chosen Moses as the sovereign but because 
God had acted through Moses who stood as a prophet in opposition to the authority of 
the Pharaoh well before the written laws had been issued at Sinai. 
Moreover, this first commandment, before Hobbes's reinterpretation, 
encourages exactly the kind of wild belief about God that Hobbes sees as dangerously 
seditious and in need of domesticating. When the more reflective reading of this 
passage is considered, the elements in the salvation narrative of the exodus story are 
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clearly the same as those in Hobbes's narrative construction of political salvation. 
The people oflsrael begin in a state of misery and war, a covenant is made with a 
sovereign, and a system of laws becomes obligatory. What is important, however, is 
where the salvation happens. In Hobbes's narrative, salvation happens as a result of 
human effort after the making of a covenant. In this very discussion about the Ten 
Commandments and the moment that Israel became a positive kingdom, salvation has 
happened prior to the making of the covenant. When one considers that leviathan is 
expected serve a messianic role in rescuing humanity from the chaos of the state of 
nature, the key phrase Hobbes has intentionally left out of the discussion-"! am the 
Lord your God that rescued you from Egypt"-holds a particular significance. One 
might see that Hobbes's original suggestion about the command from Deuteronomy 
that "revolt from the Lord your God" is meant to be equivalent to "revolt from your 
king" takes an important new meaning. Non habebis Deos alienos coram me no 
longer means just means "no foreign God," but "no God other than leviathan." 
The second commandment. Hobbes goes into detail to explain the content of 
the second commandment (and puts it in relation to the first) in his discussion about 
idolatry. In doing this, he is able to make a radical reinterpretation of these 
commandments and allow for a distinction between civil worship and divine worship. 
Hobbes is clear that this distinction must be made. Hobbes explains that those who 
distinguish between civil worship and divine worship in terms of the service of slaves 
and the service of devotees "deceive themselves." Instead, the distinction is made on 
the basis of the intention of the worshiper (xiv, 357-358). For Hobbes, civil worship 
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becomes idolatry when the civil sovereign receives divine worship and people pray 
to the civil sovereign for fair weather or only the things which God can provide. 
When a king, however, compels a person to divine worship through the threat of 
corporal punishment, this is not idolatry for Hobbes; the individual may outwardly be 
obeying the sovereign while inwardly continuing to honor God. Because he does it 
out of fear, it ceases to become his act and becomes the act of the sovereign (xiv, 359-
360). 
What becomes clear in looking at the way Hobbes reinterprets the Ten 
Commandments is that Moses is seen as the civil sovereign who is able to make the 
laws of God obligatory. The Ten Commandments are no longer to be understood as 
laws of God which are to be obeyed because the Lord rescued them from Egypt but 
because they had chosen Moses to be the mouthpiece of God to them. Hobbes repeats 
this point several times to make sure it is clear. The covenant God made with 
Abraham, then renewed with Isaac and Jacob, was dormant until the people oflsrael 
were freed from Egypt and arrived at the foot of Mount Sinai. From this time, they 
became a peculiar kingdom of God where Moses was the Lieutenant. This meant that 
the authority of Moses, just as with the authority of any other prince, was grounded in 
the consent of the people and their promise to obey him (xi, 250-251; cf. xxxv, 217-
218; xiii, 281-282). 
Therefore, this also explains the expectation of absolute salvation-salvation 
which Hobbes makes clear is offered by God to Israel, according to the Hebrew 
Scriptures-is not the basis on which laws are to be followed. Neither is God to be 
Page79 
obeyed because he is the Creator, or that he is trustworthy, or because of his 
"irresistible power" (xxxi, 214).66 Rather, it is the command of the civil sovereign that 
makes all laws obligatory, even divine ones. Without the civil force of the laws, the 
laws would remain simply laws of nature and therefore not obligatory. The reason for 
this is that Hobbes needs to present the laws as having obligatory force which is 
clearly derived from the covenant the people made with each other when they gave up 
their rights. In other words, the Sinai covenant was not a covenant between God and 
Israel but between the people oflsrael who all consented to follow Moses as the 
lawgiver and the mouthpiece of God. 
As has already been discussed, laws in Hobbes's political theory are only 
obligatory when one gives up rights through the scheme of a social contract for the 
sake of gaining salvation. However, this is clearly not the narrative order through 
which the Hebrew story of the exodus is explained in scripture. Instead, the Hebrew 
Scriptures tell of a different order. It was because God has rescued the people of 
Israel out of Egypt, and that salvation from chaos and death came first, that the 
Hebrew people were willing to trust God to save them from any situation in the 
future. This story for the Hebrew people was expected to be told "from generation to 
generation." Constantly the prophets reminded the people oflsrael that God was their 
savior and the one who rescued them out of slavery and bondage. It was even on this 
basis that any idea of resurrection and life-after-death came to be expected from God, 
giving birth to the central theological ideas of salvation presented in the New 
Testament. 67 
Page SO 
Biblical Narrative Logic and Order. In summary, anyone familiar with the 
narrative of the biblical account of the exodus will see that it presents a story of 
salvation in the following stages: 1) Egypt was, for Israel, a state of desperation and 
need; 2) from Moses's calling at the burning bush, then the miracles, plagues, and 
splitting of the Sea of Reeds, the Hebrew God intervened to save Israel from the 
horrors of Egypt; 3) a representative-Moses-was chosen both by God (at the 
burning bush) and the people oflsrael (at the foot of Mt. Sinai); and 4) God made a 
covenant with the people oflsrael, who then became obligated to obey the Ten 
Commandments because God had brought them out of Egypt. 
With these clarifications in mind, when one rereads the entire passage from 
Deuteronomy 13 again with fresh eyes, the sentence-"if a prophet rise amongst you, 
or a dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of a miracle, and the miracle 
come to pass; ifhe say, let us follow strange gods, which thou hast not known, thou 
shalt not hearken to him"-now comes to mean any Jewish or Christian believer that 
actually takes the first and second commandments at their word. In contrast, the 
traditional Jewish or faithful Christian reading, prior to Hobbes's reinterpretation, 
would have had a hard time seeing this commandment-"But that prophet and 
dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he hath spoken to you to revolt from 
the Lord your God"-without claiming it is in direct opposition to teachings exactly 
like that of Hobbes, as well as his theory and the political order his theory proposes. 
In other words, the traditional believer would have considered the Ten 
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Commandments to be universally applicable, not just applicable to Israel as a peculiar 
people, making Hobbes's 'leviathan' a "foreign God" and a "false image." 
Conclusion 
Thus, what William Cavanaugh had suggested about the theological-political 
reading of Hobbes has shown to be the case, that the most important interpretive 
insights about Hobbes's political theory derives from his usurpation of salvation 
ideas. That Hobbes intended to minimalize the Christian ideas about salvation for the 
sake of his political agenda was never much of a question. What has been shown 
here, however, is that the engineering of a system of comprehensive salvation without 
divine aid was the bedrock that underlay Hobbes's entire theory and narrative. This, 
then, complements the scholarship on Hobbes from Pocock, Strauss, Schmitt, and 
Schwartz. 
Hobbes's use of the narrative structure to tell a new story that was expected to be 
more trustworthy than other historical accounts is telling. It actually assumes that the 
biblical narrative was not only untrustworthy but also deceptive and downright 
dangerous. What one should ask, however, is the ultimate question about the real 
intent of the author. In his theory, we see that the salvation formula fits clearly. The 
individuals in Hobbes's hellish state of nature are clearly those who are in need of 
rescue; it is they who will be saved. The creation of the civil state following Hobbes's 
design will be the action that puts salvation into motion. Who is the savior in 
Hobbes's story? It first appears that the sovereign would hold that title except the 
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sovereign is obligated to the salvation covenant which he or she did not create. If we 
return to the first few phrases of Hobbes's introduction, where we began, the clues are 
now more evident. 
Pocock suggested the state itself was the messiah; Craig asserted it was reason. 
But Hobbes's theory presented both reason and the state more as tools to be utilized 
for the sake of salvation than the actual being that could be considered "the author of 
salvation"68 that would replace the biblical God. What is apparent from the argument 
throughout this thesis is that Hobbes used reason to construct the state himself; that is, 
it was the Monster ofMalmesbury himself who authored the story of salvation. 
In conclusion, what this thesis has shown is that in Leviathan, not only does the 
usurpation of the salvation narrative underlie Hobbes's political teaching, but in his 
choice of these particular portions of the Hebrew Scriptures, Hobbes aims to present 
to the careful reader that scripture is in violation of the political teaching revealed by 
reason alone. Thus, Leviathan presents an apparent but superficial attempt to show 
that scripture is in harmony with Hobbes's political teaching as based strictly on 
reason. Leviathan also presents a usurpation of the Hebrew salvation narrative to 
uphold that political teaching and eliminate all competing authorities on Earth. Also, 
however, Leviathan, for the reflective reader, serves as a veiled attack on scripture, 
presenting Moses as a seditious false prophet and the Israelites as rebellious subjects 
of the Pharaoh of Egypt. 
Page 83 
NOTES 
I. As Helmut Schelsky presents it, Hobbes's theoretical system of authority is 
meant to be more than a thought experiment. Leviathan, therefore, is a theory of 
political action. Like any political philosopher, Hobbes hopes-though 
acknowledging it may seem impossible-that the problems he illuminates and the 
solutions he suggests will someday become reality so that the problems he addresses, 
thus, will be eradicated. In fact, as I will readily point out, Hobbes believes he has 
"sufficiently, or probably" laid out the doctrines of morality and law in a way that 
other philosophers had not yet been able to do. Though I will quote a portion of this 
quite soon in the essay, it is vital to the current discussion to show here that Hobbes 
says as much himself. 
I am at the point of believing this my labour, as uselesse, and the Common-wealth of 
Plato; For he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of State, and change 
of Governments by Civill Warre, ever to be taken away, till Soveraigns be Philosophers. 
But when I consider again, that the Science ofNaturall Justice, is the onely Science 
necessary for Soveraigns, and their principall Ministers; and that they need not be 
charged with the Sciences Mathematical!, (as by Plato they are,) further, than by good 
Lawes to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither Plato, nor any other 
Philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently, or probably proved all the 
Theoremes ofMorall doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how 
to obey; I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine, may fall into 
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the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear,) 
without the help of any interested, or envious Interpreter; and by the exercise of entire 
Soveraignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, 
into the Utility of Practice. (xxxi, 193) 
What is important, however, is determining exactly what the problems are that 
Hobbes is addressing. What are the major problems that cause war and strife? Carl 
Schmitt quotes Helmut Schelsky as saying that "Hobbes challenges every theory of 
state fraught by religion, assuming thereby a place among the great political thinkers. 
His companions on this track are Machiavelli, Vico, and, more recently, Nietzsche 
and Sorel." See Helmut Shelsky, "Die Totalitiit des Staates bei Hobbes," in Archiv far 
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 31, no. 2 (1938). For Schmitt, echoing this quote from 
Schelsky in his discussion with Leo Strauss, Hobbes's practical aim is restoring the 
"original unity" of politics and religion. See Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the state 
theory of Thomas Hobbes: meaning and failure of a political symbol, trans. George 
Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 10-11. For Strauss, however, 
Hobbes's practical aim was to show that revelation and reason were utterly opposed 
and that only the latter could bring peace. This point will be drawn out further later on 
in the current essay. See Leo Strauss, "On the Basis of Hobbes's Political 
Philosophy," in What Is Political Philosophy?: And Other Studies (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), 170-196. A good discussion on this dialogue 
between Schmitt and Strauss can be found in Anna Schmidt "The problem of Carl 
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